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This thesis focuses on events in Southeast Asia which
contributed to the causes of the Chinese invasion of Vietnam
in 1979. It is shown that Vietnam was largely responsible
for the Vietnam-Cambodia conflict and for the internal
political chaos within Cambodia after 1975; that local hos-
tilities on the Indochinese peninsula were intimately re-
lated to worldwide communist/anti-communist struggles and
to the Sino-Soviet dispute; and that the Chinese invasion
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I. INTRODUCTION
This study of events in Southeast Asia between the
withdrawal of the American forces from Saigon, April 30,
1975, and the launching of the Chinese invasion of Vietnam,
February 17, 1979, is intended to examine three major
hypotheses
:
First: that the diplomatic and military initia-
tives of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam
were largely responsible for the S. R.V.-
Cambodian conflict and for the internal
political chaos within Cambodia;
Second: that local hostilities on the Indochinese
peninsula were intimately related to world-
wide communis t/anti- communist struggles
and to the Sino-Soviet dispute; and
Third: that the Chinese invasion of Vietnam was
largely in response to the earlier Viet-
namese invasion of Cambodia.
Chapter II describes the situation in Vietnam and Cambodia
as it appeared at the moment of the Vietnamese victory,
April 30, 1975. Chapter III analyzes the diplomatic moves
and military adjustments during the remainder of the year
1975 showing how the S.R.V. began the process of adjusting
itself to its neighbors; balanced its relations with China
against those with the U.S.S.R. and endeavored to establish

some sort of beneficial relationship with the U.S. Chapter
IV continues the story, with its identical themes through
1976 and 1977, showing the increasing frustrations of the
S.R.V. in Cambodia and the mounting determination for
hegemony in the Indochinese peninsula, even at the cost of
the war. Chapter V analyzes the combination of negotiating
and fighting throughout the remainder of 1977 and 1978,
culminating in the Christmas, 1978, Vietnamese invasion of
Cambodia and the resultant Chinese invasion of Vietnam,
beginning February 17, 1979.
The methodology for this thesis is the examination of
events in the period indicated as those events were reported
by journalists on the spot (relying primarily on the New
York Times and the Far Eastern Economic Review ) and as they
were interpreted by the major powers involved- -Vietnam,
Cambodia, China, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. Such primary
sources as government documents, whether originals or as
reported in the Federal Broadcast Information Services are
used wherever available. Opinions of qualified observers,
academicians and other analysts are quoted whenever valuable
or pertinent.

II. AFTER THE VICTORY: APRIL, 1975
This chapter will indicate the emergence of the basic
policies of the S.R.V. immediately after the achievement
of victory over the U.S. -South Vietnam opposition. It
will be seen that the S.R.V. actively pursued its interests
with Cambodia, apparently to solidify its strength as
opposed to a hostile and possibly formidable neighbor.
It also becomes clear that the S.R.V. did not hesitate to
take stands in opposition to China and leaning towards the
U.S.S.R. Hanoi likewise endeavored to play its American
card as skillfully as possible. The scenario described in
this chapter is that which existed when the U.S. forces
finally left Saigon at the end of April, 1975.
A. RESIDUAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA
Immediately after victory over its enemies, Vietnam
took steps to take over some of Cambodian islands despite
the fact that in 1967 the two communist parties (Cambodia
and Vietnam) agreed to the division of islands by the
Brevie Line- -a demarcation instituted by the French.
One Vietnamese senior official later admitted, "At
the time we agreed to the Brevie Line we were not aware of
problems of territorial water, continental shelf, etc.--
those new phenomena." Notable, Poulo Wai island contested
by the Vietnamese is located on the Khmer continental

3
shelf. Vietnam, in its moment of generosity to an ally,
was also not aware of the presence of oil in the Gulf of
Thailand.
South Vietnam conducted one final patriotic venture in
September 1974 when it disputed with the Lon Nol government
over the status of Poulo Wai Island. The Cambodians
supported by a foreign oil firm were conducting drilling
operations these. Although the South Vietnamese had pre-
viously appeared willing in recent months to allow the
Cambodian's Poulo Wai if Cambodia agreed on a territorial
demarcation allowing it the island of Phu Quoc, Cambodia
decided against agreement on the issue at that time.
South Vietnam reacted by sending a note on August 29
threatening "misfortune" to the oil rig if drilling con-
tinued beyond September 12. The garrison of ten Khmer
soldiers stationed on the island since the overthrow of
Sihanouk in 1970 were thereupon augmented by 300 more
troops on September 5. Lon Nol pointed out that Cambodia
had been drilling since 1972, and South Vietnamese had not
reacted before. The major difference in attitude was due
to South Vietnam's desire to win public support to its
side over Hanoi. A confrontation was averted when the oil
company decided to move to uncontested waters, and the
final decision on the islands was postponed until the end
of hostilities. Vietnam also undertook to amend the land




The area east of the Mekong in Cambodia is noted for
its rubber plantations and its vast quantities of rice.
It was in this region that Vietnam held its sanctuaries
during the Second Indochinese War. Sporadic clashes in
this area occurred in 1973 and 1974, with the aim of
evicting an unreliable ally who, it was widely believed,
wished to remain to benefit from the Parrot's Beak region's
ample resources.
The Khmer Rouge were not the only ones to suspect
Hanoi's intentions; General Fernandez, Lon Nol's Chief of
Staff, offered on December 3, 1974, to conduct joint opera-
tions with the Khmer Rouge to drive the Vietnamese from
their Cambodian enclaves. Fernandez claimed that the
North Vietnamese-Viet Cong controlled one-third of Cambodia
east of the Mekong with no intention of leaving. He believed
the Vietnamese were a greater threat to Cambodia than the
4
Khmer Rouge. Although the Khmer Rouge rejected the offer,
it make every attempt in 1974 to dislodge the Viet Cong
and longtime Vietnamese residents in the area east of the
Mekong whom the Khmer Rouge suspected of having sympathies
with the Viet Cong. " Trying to maintain its position in
Cambodia, Vietnam at the end of 1974 approached China for
a revision of the borders in Hanoi's favor, but China
refused. Clearly, Vietnam did have intentions to remain
in Cambodia.
In March 1975 border battles reportedly erupted
between the Khmer Rouge and North Vietnamese. The Khmer
11

Rouge were at that time ready to make their final drive on
Phnom Penh. North Vietnam may have seen its opportunity
to establish control over the coveted border regions before
Pol Pot and his forces could establish themselves in Phnom
Penh. Around this time Sihanouk emphatically proclaimed
that the Khmer Rouge were not puppets of the Hanoi regime
and averred that Cambodia would pursue a policy of non-
7
alignment and neutraility. In Cambodia's declaration of
independence were the seeds of its downfall. While a more
subservient state may have acceded to Vietnam's territorial
requests to promote unity among fraternal socialist
countries, Cambodia demanded equality in its relations
with Vietnam. This meant a temporary setback for Vietnam's
desire to annex the oil rich islands of the Gulf of
Thailand and to increase its real estate holdings in
Cambodia
.
B. CHINESE INTERESTS IN INDOCHINA
As easly as December 1973, Vietnam informed China of
its intentions to prospect for oil in the Gulf of Tonkin
and proposed talks for demarcating a border. China
agreed, with the condition that third parties remain away
from the Gulf.
The last shot ending the second Indochinese War in 1975
had not been fired when Vietnam undertook the liberation of
several islands claimed by China in the Spratly Island
chain. China was taken aback, as Pham Van Dong himself had
12

in 1956 concurred with China's claims to both the Spratly
and Paracel Islands, and Vietnam verbally agreed to China's
o
claims in 1954 and 1958. (Phan Van Dong, one of the four
leaders of Vietnam later discounted this pledge in 1977
saying "that was the war period and I had to say that.")
On September 6, 1973, South Vietnam announced that it
would incorporate the Spratly Islands into Phuoc Tuy
gProvince and subsequently stationed troops on Nam Yit.
In January 1974, China, in a wave of patriotism and
a possible reaction to the island fortification policy of
South Vietnam to prevent similar S.V.N, action in the
Paracels, reaffirmed its claims to both the Spratly and
Paracel Island chains, backing up its statement by landing
a group of Chinese fishermen who planted a Chinese flag on
Robert Island in the Paracels. The South Vietnamese
responded to China's January 11 claim by declaring it
would take "appropriate actions to protect South Vietnamese
sovereignty and territorial integrity," and proceeded to
move patrol boats into the area resulting on January 16
in the first of several clashes with the Chinese. China
brought in an amphibious force and bombed the islands
compelling the South Vietnamese to retreat from the superior
on-scene Chinese defenders (or aggressors, depending on
one's point of view). The South Vietnamese were forced to
abandon a weather station it had maintained on Pattle Island




Radio Peking on January 21 warned that the South Viet-
namese would have to bear the consequences if it continued
its aggressions against China, possibly hinting that the
12Spratlys would be next in line to be attacked.
Following these incidents, S.V.N, fearing an attack
1
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moved 120 soldiers into the Spratlys.
The U.S. refused to get involved in the matter, while
the U.S .S.R. - -at first- -refrained from making any statement
at all, reporting instead Chinese and U.S. official
statements of the events. However, the U.S. S.R. changed
its stance in February claiming China was exhibiting its
chauvinistic policy and greed for oil. Although the
U.S.S.R.'s own atlases identified the Paracels and Spratlys
as being Chinese territory, the U.S. S.R. did not want the
Chinese to press for other land claims which could directly
14
affect the Soviet Union. Despite Soviet claims, China
obviously saw the affair as a patriotic conflict while
South Vietnam fought a losing battle for Vietnam's histori-
cal claims. North Vietnam's reaction to the situation was
muted. When asked at a news conference on January 19, 1974,
who owned the Paracels, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong
representatives responded "no comment." Analysts believed
the North Vietnamese were embarrassed by the incident as
they had long portrayed themselves as the patriotic defenders
of the fatherland. When South Vietnam renewed the diplo-
matic offensive in March 1974, Hanoi finally broke its long
14

silence. Hanoi issued a short statement calling for peaceful
discussions on this issue.
The island disputes of 1974 aggravated longstanding
historical disputes. But most importantly, these disputes
allowed Hanoi--no longer Saigon--to become the spokesman for
all Vietnam. Hanoi's actions in 1975 represented legitimate
national interests although they would certainly be opposed
by the conflicting positions of Cambodia and China.
In April 1975, in the flush of its victories in South
Vietnam, the North Vietnamese regime launched a campaign to
recover the Spratlys and the islands in the Gulf of Thailand.
Hanoi later said that China claimed the Spratlys but in fact
these islands were occupied by the Americans and their
puppets. North Vietnam therefore disregarded historical
claims and regarded possession as the most important criteria
China was disturbed that Vietnam had taken over the islands
without negotiation; however, it declined to use military
intervention to remedy the situation possibly because Soviet
naval units would have been in the position to interfere.
On April 27 Soviet units completed their annual Spring
exercise. This was the first time the Soviets operated in
the South China Sea, only 250 miles from Shanghai. On
April 14, the Spratlys were taken. Cambodia, on the other
hand, was less reticent publicly proclaiming on April 28
that it absolutely prohibited foreign bases on its terri-
1 7
tory. At that time, besides North Vietnamese forces on
Cambodian islands, 20,000 North Vietnamese troops were
15

reported along the Ho Chi Minh trail in Parrot's Beak and
1
8
further West. Cambodia was unwilling to part with an
inch of its soil and was conducting an island war with
Vietnam at the moment of Hanoi's victory over Saigon.
C. CHANGING POSITIONS OF THE U.S. IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
The U.S. had some influence with Hanoi contributing
to the return of Poulo Wai Island to the Khmer Rouge. In
a May 1 North Vietnamese victory statement, Giap sent
greetings to the U.S. and wishes for peaceful and friendly
relations while not mentioning U.S. involvement in Indo-
19
china. Subsequently, perhaps signaling its economic
independence from China, Pham Van Dong on June 3 offered
to normalize relations with the U.S. if the U.S. would
implement its 1973 pledge of aid to Hanoi. Hanoi's offer
was the first made publicly in one and a half years by a
20
senior North Vietnamese official on the subject.'' The
U.S. rejected the aid requirement but left open the door
to normalization, with concomitant U.S. economic associa-
tions and a lifting of the trade embargo on that country.
Though Vietnam was not yet willing to drop its aid require
ment, its broaching the subject indicated that it was
laying the groundwork for the future U.S. -Vietnam relation-
ship. This provided the U.S. with a modicum of diplomatic
leverage which it used.
Poulo Wai Island fell to the Vietnamese on June 10,
1975, causing Pol Pot to make a hasty visit to Peking,
16

21followed by a flight to Hanoi. The situation was critical,
threatening to escalate into major warfare. On June 13,
Phnom Penh radio mysteriously failed to broadcast at the
6 a.m. and 11 a.m. time slots possibly signifying a major
2 2
reappraisal of Cambodian policies was taking place. In
late June fighting was reported in the Parrot's Beak area
23
and was confirmed by Secretary Kissinger.
Although the U.S. was still smarting from the May
Mayaguez incident, Secretary Kissinger on June 18 warned
countries against throwing their weight around Asia and
said that U.S. normalization of relations depended on both
a state's "conduct to their neighbors and their attitude
towards us." Kissinger warned against countries using a
preponderance of power or blackmail to reach their aims.
Although Kissinger was primarily trying to show continued
U.S. interest in Southeast Asia to allay the fears of ASEAN
and Japan about Hanoi, the statements were equally applica-
24ble to Hanoi for its relations with Cambodia.
Kissinger's confirmation of Vietnamese-Cambodian problems
in late June showed that the U.S. was concerned about the
situation in Indochina. Hanoi would be jeopardizing a
future economic relationship with the U.S. if it continued
its aggressive stance against Cambodia and would further
alienate Southeast Asian states who were suspicious of North
Vietnam's intentions in the first place. The extent of U.S.
influence on Hanoi's decision to return the island of Poulo
Wai is undetermined though it would constitute at least one
17

reason for Hanoi to take its fight against Cambodia
underground. A pattern of U.S. policy towards Vietnam
emerged as the U.S. used the normalization of relations
"bait" consistently throughout the next few years in an
attempt to place some controls on Vietnam's behavior.
Also evident were the beginnings of a U.S. -Chinese
partnership concerning Indochinese affairs and the
briding of Vietnam.
An interesting footnote to the Cambodian delegation's
visit to Peking in mid-August was the relative treatment
given to that delegation and to the Vietnamese delegation
that preceded it to Peking just one day earlier (August 14)
The Vietnamese economic delegation led by Le Thanh Nghi
arrived to a cool but correct meeting but was not allowed
to see Teng Hsiao-ping. Cambodia's delegation, however,
due in part to the fact that the trip to Peking was the
first public visit outside the country by that state's
leaders since the April victory, received an extremely
warm welcome with an editorial on the first page of Jenmin
25Jih Pao extolling the event. The stark contrast, though,
was due to a multitude of factors in addition to Cambodian-
Vietnamese problems which were causing a rapid deteriora-
tion of Sino-Vietnamese relations.
D. INDOCHINA AND THE SINO SOVIET CONFLICT
In the midst of the turmoil between the two states,
Prince Sihanouk was formally invited to return to Cambodia
18

(July 18, 1975). Sihanouk was long supported by China
as the only leader that could coalesce the disparate groups
in Cambodia to ensure that it remained an independent state
He was not a beloved figure to the Khmer Rouge, however, as
he fought Khmer Rouge guerrillas while he was in power in
the pre-1970's. His return may have been the price China
charged to help mediate the conflict in Phnom Penh's favor.
On July 26, Phnom Penh aired a broadcast stressing
peaceful coexistence among Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand
and Laos. Vietnam returned two small islands, Koh Tonsay
and Poulo Wai , to Phnom Penh and Le Duan , the head of the
Communist Party of Vietnam paid a formal visit to the
Cambodian capital. Messages of friendship and good will
27
were exchanged but tensions continued to stir beneath
the placid surface. Less than two weeks after Le Duan's
visit to Phnom Penh, leng Sary and Khieu Samphan led a high
level Cambodian delegation to Peking where they may have
obtained in an August 18 aid agreement a provision for
patrol boats to protect its island holdings. While enroute
a visit with Sihanouk who was visiting North Korea, Khieu
Sampham was reported to have visited the Luta naval ship-
28
yards where the items of interest were patrol boats.
The mid-August visit to Peking, however, probably provided
more than military aid assurances, as the technical and
economic aid agreement contained an anti-hegemony clause
which could be viewed as advantageous to both Peking and
29
Phnom Penh. Of interest, the delegation also met with
19

Hua Kuo-feng, who was then Minister of Public Security.
Hua's presence was considered unusual for talks with a
foreign delegation.
By way of summary it should be noted that the S.R.V.
has its own version of the events of early 1975, including
the conflicts with Cambodia and China. The S.R.V. blamed
Cambodia for aggression over the islands and let it be
known that old quarrels between China and the Sayon regime
would have to be reexamined as issues between equal socia-
list sovereign states.
At the moment of victory, the S.R.V. had little to
fear from Cambodia or Laos. All that was required on the
part of the S.R.V. was to build up its own internal strength
so that the S.R.V. could adopt a defense-by-offense policy
if that seemed to be called for in dealing with Cambodia
or Laos. No one could be certain whether at some time in
the future the S.R.V. would be content with its existing
position on the Indochinese peninsula or would seek hegemony
in some sort of Indochina Federation. A latent fear existed
in some quarters that the S.R.V., inflated by its victory,
might go beyond Indochina and seek a greater destiny as the
leading power in all of Southeast Asia.
Whatever the future, it seemed clear in the Spring of
1975, the S.R.V. was first obliged to get its relations in
order with its allies and supporters, China and the U.S.S.R.
In looking towards China, the S.R.V. was aware of the
fact that Chou En lai was still alive and so was Mao
20

Tse-tung. Ling Hsiao ping was ostensibly in power but
he was in the shadow of the gang of four. The S.R.V.
would have to prepare alternatives in dealing with future
China- -whether China would continue as a revolutionary model
or whether it would seriously embark on the "ominous" (from
the point of view of the S.R.V.) program of the four moder-
nizations .
As for the U.S.S.R., the S.R.V. regarded the U.S.S.R.
as its military mentor, respected socialist ally, and most
likely source of advice and help for future development.
The S.R.V. was entirely aware of the Sino-Soviet split and
of the difficulties of carrying water on both shoulders.
The S.R.V. was geographically in the shadow of China and
therefore in constant danger of invasion. The U.S.S.R.
was distant but powerful. The S.R.V. was constrained to
maintain friendship with both, if possible, but to choose
wisely if forced to make a choice.
It was still too early to determine whether the S.R.V.
could establish any kind of detente with the U.S. The




III. PREPARATION FOR THE FUTURE: 19 7 5
At the moment of victory in Indochina it was clear that
an old era had come to an end. The preoccupation of the
victor throughout 1975 and into 1976 was to consolidate its
victory and to prepare for a stronger future. This chapter
begins with an analysis of the S.R.V.'s relations with its
neighbors--Loas , Cambodia, Thailand and the Philippines.
It then explores S.R.V. policies toward China (increasingly
unfriendly) and toward the U.S.S.R. (increasingly friendly).
After an analysis of the S.R.V. demarilies towards the U.S.,
the chapter ends with an overview of the situation on the
Indochina peninsula as the year 1975 drew to a close.
A. THE S.R.V. AND ITS NEIGHBORS
Since 1930 Hanoi either overtly or covertly supported
a federation of the Indochinese states comprised of Laos,
Cambodia and Vietnam in which Vietnam would have the
dominant position. Therefore, the S.R.V. first turned
attention to Cambodia, with whom it was in perennial conflict
over the disputed islands, the border territories and the
proper relationships between the Khmer Rouge and the govern-
ment of the S.R.V. As Pol Pot, backed by China, increased
his power in Phnom Penh, the S.R.V. felt obliged to send
increasing numbers of troops into Cambodia to oppose him.
The Vietnamese mounted a major offensive against the
22

Khmer Rouge in April 1975 without even informing China of
their plans
.
One probable reason why China was left ignorant of the
timing was because a Vietnamese invasion of the Spratlys
was part of the strategy devised by the Soviets and their
Vietnamese colleagues. If China were made aware of the
precise moment for the launching of the offensive, it might
have decided to insure its position in the Spratlys, thereby
preempting Vietnam's capture of the islands. Knowledge
that the Soviets were involved in the planning of this event
would surely have intensified Chinese suspicions regarding
selfish Soviet motives in the whole of Southeast Asia.
Furthermore, it was wise for Vietnam to keep China in ig-
norance about the Cambodia drive in order to forestall
massive or event significant amounts of aid from China to
Cambodia. Logically, if Vietnam had any pretentions of
pushing Cambodia into the Indochinese Federation that it
so long talked about, it had to do so before China invested
too much aid and comfort in the Khmer Rouge.
Vietnam showed a paralled concern for its influence
in Laos, where Peking actively opposed any Vietnamese effort
2
to incorporate Laos in an Indochinese Federation. The
Vietnamese made substantial inroads with the Pathet Lao
whom they actively supported militarily despite their
denials. At one point in 1973, 60,000-70,000 North Vietnamese
troops provided assistance to the Pathet Lao although the
23

number was reduced to approximately 30,000 by April 1973-
-
about the same number which remains in Laos today. By
itself, however, Vietnam could not hope to destroy the
reservoir of good will that China had meticulously created
for itself in Laos where a large presence of 14,000 road
workers provided assistance and engaged in proselytizing
efforts. To undermine Chinese influence Vietnam needed a
partner that could provide adequate financial inducements
to tilt the balance. In June the influx of Soviet advisors
began to arrive and the U.S.S.R. embassy staff increased to
4100 persons; it was obvious who that partner was to be.
Laotian actions against Thailand throughout the summer
gave preliminary indications of such a shift to the detri-
ment of Chinese policy goals.
From its neighbors in Indochina, the S.R.V. turned its
attention to Thailand which was an uneasy target because of
its association with the U.S. in the Indochina hostilities.
Thailand's incentive for reevaluating its policies was due
to its proximity to contested regions in Indochina. On
21 March Thailand declared that it would no longer allow
the U.S. use of its bases in Thailand for airlifting materiel
to the beleaguered regime in Cambodia; further, it announced
that it was planning to recognize the new regime when it
came to power. On 1 May, just one day after Vietnam demanded
Thailand return 125 aircraft that had been flown to that
country, Thailand obtained agreement from the U.S. to
24

withdraw 9,000 of its 25,000 troops stationed in that
country in an initial phased withdrawal to be completed
within a year. The U.S. continued to reiterate its commit-
ment to stand by Thailand via defense arrangements should
7the need arise. Thailand emphasized its new stance on
14 May when it strongly protested U.S. use of Thai bases
o
against Cambodia during the Mayaguez incident.
Vietnam hoped to encourage Thailand's initial steps to
eliminate the U.S. presence and assumed the "carrot"
approach by sending Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien to
Thailand in the latter half of May. Relations seemed to
be on the upswing but Thailand was also making initiatives
towards China which resulted in normalization of relations
on 1 July. Undoubtedly Premier Kukrit received China's
assurances on Cambodia's non-hostile intentions towards
Thailand and a full briefing on Peking's perceptions of
Hanoi's aims. Relations between Thailand and Vietnam
became noticeably strained as Thailand had a new patron to
ensure its independence and no longer felt it necessary to
succumb to Hanoi's pressuring. China's entry in place of
the receding American presence must have been viewed as an
anathema to the Vietnamese who repeatedly referred to
Thailand as War Zone D and maintained a logistics network
9
originating in Hanoi to supply the Thai insurgents.
With the Pathet Lao victory in Laos, border tensions
between Laos and Thailand grew sharper. Throughout the
25

summer, the Thais protested against the influx of Laos
refugees and the Laos accused the Thais of planting counter
insurgents in the refugee camps. The Vietnamese insisted
that that Thais were really a cover for nefarious American
10purposes
.
Hanoi dropped its pretense of friendship with the Thais
and accused Thailand of providing the jumping off area for
reactionaries against all three Indochinese regimes. It
demounced Thailand's planned August naval exercises with
the United States and repeated its insistence that the
Americans should be driven out of Thai bases as soon as
possible. Perhaps the S.R.V. should have realized that
in encouraging the Thais to expel the Americans, the
Vietnamese were paving the way for closer Thai-Chinese
relations. It could be expected that the Thais would seek
help wherever they could find it in opposing the Vietnamese
juggernaut as it approached ever closer through Cambodia.
Hanoi pursued a cautious policy toward the Philippines.
Go early as October 1974, President Marcos had called an
emergency meeting of the Philippine Foreign Policy and
National Security Councils to speed the normalization of
relations between China and the U.S.S.R. Along these
lines, Marcos on April 11 conferred by decree citizenship
on 100,000 ethnic Chinese, thereby removing their stateless
12
status and a bone of contention with China. The
Philippines worried that U.S. statements of intent were not
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backed up by the U.S. Congress (as exhibited in U.S. refusal
to aid either South Vietnam or Cambodia in the final stage
of war) . J Accordingly, on April 18, the same day that ASEAN
recognized Cambodia (from then on Kampuchea) , President
Marcos called a policy meeting to discuss abrogation of the
mutual defense treaty with the U.S. and the return of Clark
Air Force Base and Subic Naval Base to Philippines' control.
Marcos was disposed to disassociate himself as far as possible
from his single alternative of complete dependence on the U.S.
While Vietnamese-Thai relations deteriorated, Vietnam
attempted to improve relations with the Philippines possibly
to show Thailand how friendly relations could be between a
Communist and a non-Communist state if the latter chose to
align itself with Hanoi. Although the Philippines were
making much noise about kicking out the U.S., it never made
any concrete reduction of U.S. presence as did the Thais.
Though the Philippines and Thailand simultaneously normal-
ized relations with China, this apparently did not cause
much acrimony in Hanoi as Vietnam on August 7 unilaterally
normalized relations with Manila. This was reportedly
accomplished by Vietnam's pressuring a Philippine diplomat
who was in Vietnam trying to ascertain the fate of Filipinos
trapped in South Vietnam with the fall of Saigon. Though
the diplomat lacked the powers to take such a step, Hanoi
loudly proclaimed the diplomatic achievement. Despite
Manila's informing Hanoi that the normalization was
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unilateral and thus invalid, Phan Hien declared in a
October 10 interview that the normalization of relations
was based on three principles, one of which was agreement
to prohibit a third country's use of their territories as
a base to attack neighboring countries or each other.
Hanoi's attempt, apparently, was to neutralize U.S. forces
on the Philippines even if they remained on Filipino soil.
In addition to these initiatives, the S.R.V. stepped up
its efforts to strengthen insurgency movements in potentially
unfriendly countries. After the fall of Saigon, Hanoi found
itself heir to at least three billion dollars worth of
modern military equipment which Peking believed would be
used by Vietnam to obtain leadership in insurgency movements
in Southeast Asia and elsewhere at the expense of China.
Reports that Vietnam was making contacts with Middle Eastern
and African countries to peddle the merchandise appeared to
1
7
substantiate those fears. Concurrently, Vietnam was making
inroads in the Thai and Malaysian Communist parties. A
schism was reported in the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT)
in which youthful pro-Hanoi elements were opposing the old-
style Maoist concepts of winning the loyalty of the peasantry
to capture the countryside and were opting instead for
1
S
formenting revolution in the cities. The upswing in urban
terrorism in Malaysia in the summer of 1975 also signified





Concerned that its inaction with the insurgency movements
would provide an opening for Vietnamese, hence Soviet, intru-
sions into the region, the Chinese in May issued several
messages of support to the various movements urging them to
continue their efforts. One message was a perfunctory
acknowledgement of the 45th anniversary of the MCP which
may have been a required gesture on Peking's part. Due to
the increasing insurgency-inspired violence in Malaysia
that had arisen since the normalization of relations between
the countries, however, Kuala Lumpur claimed that China had
reneged on its May commitment not to interfere in the internal
19politics of that country. The MCP's wave of terrorism--
aided by the arrival of sophisticated weaponry from Vietnam-
-
showed vividly that another hand was involved in manipulation
20
of factions within the party. The Malaysian case confirmed
Peking's apprehensions that Vietnam was attempting to exert
control over the insurgency movements and that Hanoi was not
averse to parting with some of its weapons to do so. More
significantly, the timing of the insurgency actions closely
after normalization between Malaysia and China showed that
Hanoi was prepared to use its new strength to influence
Chinese diplomacy in the region. By revealing Peking's
apparent paradox, supporting insurgencies while courting
improved state relations, Vietnam was able to increase
already strong suspicions of China in Indonesia and Malaysia
who were inclined to think the worst of Chinese behavior.
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Three sub-themes emerge from this analysis of the
activities of the S.R.V. during the remainder of 1975.
These are the developing antagonism between the S.R.V. and
China; the tightening of the bonds between the S.R.V. and
the U.S.S.R.; and the continuing efforts to neutralize or
eliminate the American presence in Southeast Asia.
B. DEVELOPING ANTAGONISM BETWEEN THE S.R.V. AND CHINA
China was unwilling to have Vietnam expand its control
over Laos and Cambodia, especially when continuing friendly
relations between Peking and Hanoi were seriously in
question. China responded to the capitalist encirclement
strategy in the 1960's by building an impressive network of
highways in surrounding states which would allow Peking
access to the water arteries in the Arabian Sea, Bay of
Bengal, Gulf of Siam and the South China Sea affording
Peking the means to obtain Third-World sources of raw
materials. By necessity, China cultivated state-to-state
relations with the countries in which these links to the
outside world were constructed, i.e., Pakistan, Afghanistan,
Burma, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. Some of these roads
have yet to be completed and China needed raw materials
less than it required technology from industrialized nations
China's Third-World strategy was the only policy it could
pursue at a time when the major industrialized nations were
opposed to China's goals of modernization.
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Another continuing bone of contention, intense distrust
of the indigenous population in South Vietnam prevented their
effective utilization in the postwar years. Instead of using
the trained individuals present in South Vietnam, Hanoi
introduced cadres from the north causing managerial problems
in both segments of the country. In a few short years, the
most distrusted of the lot, 150,000 ethnic Chinese, would
find themselves forcibly ejected.
Senator Mike Mansfield's visit to China in early 1975
saw differences between China and Vietnam. In meetings
with the senator, China indicated that it desired neutralist
states, not necessarily Communist in orientation, in
Southeast Asia. China's interest in Cambodia's future
status was evident in these discussions, but it exhibited
21
an almost total lack of interest in Vietnam Cambodia had
obviously supplanted Vietnam as China's chief protege.
An unconfirmed but credible March 1975 report circulated
by Taiwan offers a glimpse of Chinese impressions of Vietnam.
Chiang Ching in an address to Foreign Ministry officials was
said to have described Vietnam as being "like one temple
having four abbots who regard as patrons those giving gruel
or cloth." This derisive statement implied that the Viet-
namese leaders would beg from anyone for trifles. The wife
of Mao Tse-tung continued by saying Mao had reflected that
the Vietnamese people would rise against their leadership
if they ascribed to the Soviet brand of communism which
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which emphasized industrialization above agriculture. She
also allegedly averred that Vietnam was not what it was
under Ho Chi Minh who tried to reconcile Peking and Moscow
and refused to take sides. Though denied by China as
Republic of China propaganda, Vietnam, it was said,
22believed the source was China. If accurate, the report
shows Chinese disenchantment with Vietnam's pro-Soviet
leanings and suspicion of Hanoi's policies from at least
early 1975.
Antagonism between the S.R.V. and China became increas-
ingly apparent during the summer of 1975. China's policies
by necessity were to hinder Vietnam's outward reach which
China perceived as Soviet intrusion into the area. Peking
hoped to maintain Laotian neutrality by massive doses of
aid, while it encouraged Cambodia to maintain a hostile
stance toward both Vietnam and the Soviet Union. China
supported the efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) for a region of peace and neutrality and
hoped to strengthen that organization to insulate it
further from Soviet influence. To counter Soviet influence
in the insurgency movements of Southeast Asia, Peking was
placed in the delicate position of providing at least nomi-
nal support of those movements while at the same time
trying to internally strengthen the non-Communist regimes.
China explained this situation by saying state-to-state
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relations and party-to-party relations were different; thus,
it could pursue both simultaneously.
In August, Le Thanh Nghi of Vietnam visited Peking to
help save its deteriorating economic situation. Vietnam's
massive management problems greatly increased the require-
ments for aid, but China was unwilling to make additional
sacrifices that would further drain its own economy, and
permit Vietnam to expand its influence in Laos and battle
the Cambodians. China's attitudes towards Hanoi had
crystallized. Vietnam's systematic approach of undermining
China's position in Southeast Asia was not something China
wished to reward nor further by increasing its financial
commitment. During Nghi's visit, which was met by considera
ble coolness, the Chinese had been reported to complain
about Vietnam's greediness and ingratitude to the Chinese
who had so generously made sacrifices to the Vietnamese war
effort against the U.S. The ingratitude, Peking felt, was
exhibited in the anti-Peking policies Vietnam had begun to
adopt.
Nghi's visit was said to be of a preliminary nature,
but it is probable that at this time the Vietnamese voiced
their eagerness that China live up to Chou's 1973 agreement
that China would continue its military and economic aid
24
for five years after the war's end. China's agreement,
however, was contingent upon Vietnam's abiding by the 1973
peace agreement which Hanoi chose to ignore. With Vietnam's
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support for insurgent movements an antethetical to Peking's
policies in Southeast Asia and Hanoi's policies of terri-
torial aggrandizement at the expense of China and its allies,
China's unwillingness to continue military aid is under-
standable. China could not understand Vietnam's request for
more weaponry at a time when Vietnam had dire economic
25problems, and had several billion dollars worth of sophis-
ticated arms and supplies acquired upon the fall of Saigon.
China's major interest at this time was to persuade the
S.R.V. to sign an antihegemony agreement, which of course
was of no interest whatever to the S.R.V. seeking also the
aid of the U.S.S.R.
Following LeThanh Nghi's visit to Peking in August,
Nhan Dan began openly describing the massive economic problems
that were besetting Vietnam. The timing of these epistles
suggest Vietnam was trying to convince China that it was
interested only in resurrecting the Vietnamese economy and
not in military conquest. A midsummer wet season lull in
fighting against Cambodia was perhaps part of this policy
to elicit increased funding from the Chinese. However, for
reasons cited above, China was not likely to see Vietnamese
activities as having pacific aims, and Peking was averse to
providing massive aid of any type that would only help
Hanoi become a more viable partner to the Soviets.
Le Duan arrived in Peking on 22 September for a seven-
day visit which would become a turning point for
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Sino-Vietnamese relations. In exchange for aid of any
magnitude Vietnam would have to demonstrate its neutrality.
In perhaps a last attempt to sway the Vietnamese from their
partnership with the Soviets, Teng at a banquet for the
visiting Vietnamese delegation warned of Soviet exploitation
of those with which it had partnerships. But, just as its
billions of dollars' worth of aid failed to maintain Vietnam's
neutral stance between the Soviet Union and China, no amount
of pleading would dissuade the Vietnamese from its pro-Soviet
stance. Although Le Duan obtained two aid agreements from
China they were not long term agreements of the type necessary
to support Vietnam's 1976-1980 five-year plan. The aid
Vietnam did receive was to serve as a reminder that there
was another source available for support when Vietnam tired
of being exploited by the U.S.S.R. No military aid agreement
was signed, nor was there a final communique issued because
China undoubtedly insisted upon an anti -hegemony clause to
27
which Vietnam could not ascribe.
In late October 1975, Peking and Hanoi reached a climax
of confrontation. Failing to drive a wedge between Vietnam
and the U.S.S.R., China adopted new diplomatic tactics in
Southeast Asia. Accepting the reality of close S.R.V.-
U.S.S.R. ties, China, with evidence to back up its claims
of Vietnamese perfidy, could then press for an anti-Soviet,
anti-Vietnamese alliance in Southeast Asia that had thus
far eluded it. To counter this move, Vietnam tried to
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place the onus on the Chinese for its solidifying its ties
with the Soviets by implying that it had to join the Soviet
camp because it had nowhere else to turn in the midst of
2 8
an economic crisis within its country.
Meanwhile, China also intensified its propaganda
29
campaign to Southeast Asia. On September 26 Foreign
Minister Chiao Kuan-hua accused the Soviet Union of trying
to fill the vacuum in Indo-China after the withdrawal of
U.S. forces from the region. On October 5 Teng stated
at a banquet that "Today the most dangerous source of war
is the superpower that is the most zealous of preaching
peace." Though Teng did not mention who that power was,
it precipitated the first Soviet walk-out from a Chinese
31banquet in three years. These and similar statements
were noticeably directed against the Russians, not the
Vietnamese, perhaps in the forlorn hope that the Vietnamese
would eventually see through the Soviet schemes and,
like the Chinese, bolt from the Soviet camp.
C. TIGHTENING THE BONDS BETWEEN THE S.R.V. AND THE U.S.S.R
The Russian interest in the S.R.V. is manifest. The
Russians had contributed massively to one victory of
Vietnam and could be expected to be willing to pay a sub-
stantial price to turn the Vietnamese victory as far as
possible to the advantage of the Russian national interest.
This tactic was particularly evident throughout 1975.
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The S.R.V.'s advances into Cambodia and Laos worked to
the benefit of the U.S.S.R. Russian influence over a domi-
nant Vietnam in the Indochinese peninsula meant that the
U.S.S.R. would have in effect placed a pincer on China
from the north and the south. The Soviet Union's naval
display in its Spring exercises, operating in the East China
Sea targeted against sea lanes of Japan, illustrated the point
that it could blockade China from the east; with Vietnam as
an ally, Cam Ranh Bay in Soviet hands would complete the
naval blockade.
In early May rumors began to circulate that the Soviets
had requested use of Cam Ranh Bay for both payment for
extensive Soviet aid throughout the war and for future
32
support. Secretary of State Kissinger on May 12 denounced
Soviet expansionism and warned against its moving against
Southeast Asia and its acquiring Cam Ranh Bay as a naval and
air facility. Vietnam denied that it would give base rights
to the Soviets at Cam Ranh Bay but later indicated that it
would not be averse to the Soviets using its port facilities-
-
a tenuous distinction which would allow Soviet naval combatants
to threaten southern China.
In late June in the midst of the territorial disputes
between Vietnam and Cambodia, Teng apparently associating
Vietnam's bellicose activities with the acquiescence of its
patron, formally warned of Soviet quests for bases. In
July a People ' s Daily article expressed China's fears by
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warning that the U.S.S.R. was trying to take
advantage of the predilection of the Asian states for dis-
mantling U.S. bases by "secretly sneaking into some areas
35
to seek new bases and spheres of influence." Hanoi
officials responded to these charges averring that the
U.S.S.R. would not seek bases in Vietnam because that had
an "imperialist odor" attached to it; however, they said
if the U.S.S.R. wished, its "ships would enjoy similar
facilities at Cam Ranh Bay to ships of other friendly
countries." Later, in September when Hanoi's dependence
on the Soviets became more apparent, an Izvestia article
claimed that the U.S.S.R. wanted Vietnam to remain inde-
37pendent and had no designs on Cam Ranh Bay.
Hanoi's acceptance of Soviet rather than Chinese in-
struction for the final phase of the takeover of South
Vietnam signified that Hanoi would be inclined to pursue
the Russian rather than the Chinese brand of communism
in the future. Both China and the Soviet Union sent high-
level military delegations to assist Hanoi in the final
assault on Saigon, but the Soviet delegation, led by
General V. G. Juklov, Chief of Staff of the U.S.S.R. armed
forces, succeeded in convincing Vietnam to accept a strate-
gy of a lightning offensive utilizing heavy armor that
would cause a rapid collapse of the Saigon regime.
China cautioned Hanoi against this type of strategy suggest-
ing Vietnam instead take a more gradual approach with a major
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proselytizing effort to win the support of the population.
The Soviet method would gain a swift military victory,
but South Vietnam would become a huge concentration camp
comprised of a hostile population impeding any attempts of
the Vietnamese to advance policies of reconstruction and
integration with the north. Since China's strategy would
require years to accomplish, Vietnam followed the Russian
advice
.
In August Le Thanh Nghi visited Moscow after his dis-
appointing reception in Peking. In Moscow he was greeted
by an enthusiastic audience and a Communist editorial of
39 » a •10,000 words urging the smashing of Maoism. According
to this editorial, the U.S.S.R. was motivated to support
actively Vietnam because of its perception that China was
trying to break out of the encirclement imposed by the
Soviet Union and was attempting an encirclement strategy
40
of its own against Soviet interests in Europe and in Asia.
Peking's purpose in the short run was to draw Soviet forces
away from the Sino-Soviet border; in the long run it hoped
to create a suitable alliance to counter Soviet's alleged
"hegemony", the editorial said. Gaining Vietnam as an overt
ally would allow the U.S.S.R. to thwart China's purposes.
In August the Russians again brought up the matter of
an Asian collective security pact that, if accepted, would
allow the U.S.S.R. to obtain a foothold in the region.
Brezhnev had first proposed the pact in 1969 at the height
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of Sino-Soviet tension; the aim of which was the "renunciation
of the use of force between states, respect of sovereignty,
inviolability of frontiers, non-interference in other countries
internal affairs and development of economic and other coopera-
41
tion. The Soviets then and later said China could adhere to
the pact thus avoiding the allegation that the pact was an
anti-Chinese instrument. The U.S.S.R. was well aware of the
fact that China would not affix its signature to any agreement
that would mean the renunciation of its territorial claims
along the Sino-Soviet border or elsewhere. The Asian
Collective Security Pact never had much chance in being accepted
as other Asian states had claims against their neighbors that
were unlikely to be dropped, and no Asian state wanted to
alienate China.
"The Russians again brought up the subject especially to
counter China's initiatives for Southeast Asian nations to
join with it in an alliance against Vietnamese (or Soviet)
expansionism. The renewed proposal for the pact in August
1975 served as a subtle reminder that the U.S.S.R. could
wreak havoc in Southeast Asia if it deemed necessary to do
so. Thus, any alliance on the part of any Southeast Asian
nation with China would be doomed to failure in the conceptual
stage and as a result the neutrality of Southeast Asia
between the U.S.S.R. and China would be ensured. As long as
a neutralized ASEAN remained only an economic organization
and did not evolve into a defensive association as well, and
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as long as the U.S. refrained from involvement in the region,
Vietnam could act the role of the "Cuba of the East"
unimpeded.
The U.S.S.R., meanwhile, used Vietnam to exert pressure
in achieving the total removal of U.S. forces from Southeast
Asia. Laotian actions against Thailand were much larger
than just promoting Vietnamese interests as the strategy
emanated from the Soviet Union.
The Soviets began, in a heavy-handed fashion, a similar
strategy of neutralizing Japan. Because Vietnam was not in
the position to militarily threaten Japan, the Soviet Union
had to rattle its own sabres, threatening Japan with dire
consequences if Japan signed a treaty of friendship and
cooperation of quasi-alliance with China. Though Russia
could have easily brought Japan over to its side by returning
islands which had been captured during the Second World War,
it believed that the mere threat of the use of force would
be enough to keep Japan in line. Thus, beginning in 1975,
Russia started exercises in the East China Sea and began
building up its Pacific Fleet. These exercises went so
far as to conduct a marine and airborne invasion on one of
the Kurile Islands in its possession; Japan duly took note
of the incident realizing the similarities of land features
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in that island with that of Japan proper.
The Soviet tactics caused an up-welling of anti-Soviet
of public opinion in Japan, leading eventually to the very
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kind of Sino-Japanese treaty which the Soviets had tried to
avoid. Vietnam could not have been too pleased with the
counter productive results of the Russian iniatives in
Japan because of their specific consequences to Vietnam.
Japan was less eager to aid Vietnam or to give any kind of
support to Vietnam in the Sino-Vietnam controversy because
of Japan's perception of the obvious U.S .S .R. -Vietnam
connection.
The ultimate aim of encirclement was to isolate China
forcing it, in a state of weakness, to submit to Soviet
leadership. If Soviet tactics worked adequately, force
may not even have to be used as the threat of overwhelming
destruction would cause capitulation. Delivering Southeast
Asia to Vietnam's hands as payment for its efforts would be
a small price to pay if Russia and Vietnam together were
to be able to eliminate any effective Chinese challenge to
their joint leadership in East Asia. Nothing came of the
August efforts of the Soviets to forward the long-range
Brezhnev objective of an Asian security pact.
Le Duan succeeded in getting two long-term agreements
from Moscow in late October in exchange for something it
was unwilling to grant to Peking-
-
complete political agree -
ment . In a 16-page political declaration, both sides said
they "held completely identical views," with Hanoi announc-
ing its support for the foreign policy of the Soviet Union,
particularly detente. Vietnam affirmed its support for the
Communists in Portugal and acknowledged agreement with
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Soviet policies in support of India against Pakistan; both
of these policies along with detente were not supported by
China.
Cambodia was the first to bear the brunt of the U.S. S.R.-
Vietnam understanding first in the form of coup attempts,
then by the use of Vietnamese troops after pro-Chinese
forces in Cambodia had been successfully overcome.
In summary, events during the first ten months of 1975
brought about a new alignment of power in which the U.S.S.R.
was striving for a neutral Southeast Asia and Japan to achieve
its divide and conquer strategy, while the Chinese perceived
strong alliances as the only means to keep the Soviets at
bay. What finally evolved was a tenuous neutrality in
Southeast Asia where neither China or the Soviet Union
gained a decisive upper hand.
D. THE S.R.V. AND THE U.S. PRESENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
While pursuing policies in 1975 which led to increasing
estrangement with China and growing rapport with the U.S.S.R.,
the S.R.V. made a slow beginning in attempts to limit or
eliminate the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia.
Though China saw the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia
as necessary to keep the Soviets at bay, the states in that
region, other than Vietnam, began to see association with
the U.S. as a debit rather than an asset. The Indo-China .
debacle badly damaged faith in America's military strength
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and its worth as an ally. There was concern, magnified by
Vietnamese policies, that alignment with the U.S. would
result in subversion or open conflict against their ruling
governments. Therefore, at the May meeting of ASEAN in
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia espoused nor -alignment and neutrality
as the byline for future foreign policy initiatives. ASEAN's
"Peace Zone" was aimed at the eventual elimination of foreign
bases and the prohibition of defense pacts with outside
44powers. The May meeting ruled out acceptance of the Soviet
proposal for an Asian Collective Security Pact. In accord-
ance with the new philosophy, the Philippines and Thailand
called for the disestablishment of Southeast Asian Treaty
Organization (SEATO). 45
Hanoi took advantage of the situation by demanding
Thailand and the Philippines, as hosts for American bases
and calling upon all the members of ASEAN to reject an
American military involvement. The S.R.V. called upon all
its neighbors to return all the weapons and supplies that
had been taken out of Vietnam by fleeing refugees.
While this situation was developing, China changed its
stance toward the American presence. China saw the U.S. in
strategic retreat and no longer feared an American attack
on the Chinese mainland. The U.S.S.R. becomes China's
Enemy No. 1, so China wanted to keep the U.S. presence in
Southeast Asia to offset the growing Russian influence.
China admonished the Southeast Asian nations, including the
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S.R.V. not to let "the lion come in from the back door
while the wolf left by the front gate."
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IV. THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF THE CAMBODIAN ISSUE
By the end of 1975 it was apparent that relations with
Cambodia would constitute the key element in the evolution
of the foreign policy of the S.R.V. Likewise Cambodia
became the major factor in the larger picture of Chinese-
Russian relations.
An independent Cambodia, as envisioned by China, was
perceived as an obstacle for both the U.S.S.R. and Vietnam
who aimed for the encirclement of China and leadership in
a regional domain, respectively. Cambodia's rejection of
Vietnamese demands on Cambodia signaled its unwillingness
to adhere to a relationship granting Vietnam a dominant
position in its internal affairs as Vietnam had in Laos.
This meant further relations between Cambodia and Vietnam
would be based on confrontation. Furthermore, historical
animosities made post-war cooperation between the two
countries highly unlikely.
This chapter will trace the centuries -long historical
disputes between the two countries and present a detailed
analysis of the immediate background of the conflict which
broke out in open hostilities in the latter part of 1975.
A. HISTORICAL ANTAGONISM BETWEEN CAMBODIA AND VIETNAM
Pol Pot's apprehensions about Vietnamese presence on
Cambodian soil was understandable in light of historical
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Vietnamese transgressions on Khmer territory. In the early
part of the 17th Century the Vietnamese began their first
encroachments upon the Mekong Delta. Since that time, the
mere survival of Cambodia has been in question as the Thais
to the west and the Vietnamese to the east took every
opportunity to nibble away territory. Early in the 19th
Century Thailand held suzerainty over the westernmost
provinces of Cambodia, i.e., Battambang and Siem Reap,
while the Mekong area near Saigon (once Prey Nokor) was
absorbed by the Vietnamese.
In the 1830' s the Vietnamese placed a figurehead queen
on the throne and from that moment on the modern Cambodian
antipathy for the Vietnamese was born. The Vietnamese began
a program of "Vietnamization" where every level from the
administration of the country to the clothes of the officials
were patterned after Vietnam. Even the Theravada Buddhist
Church came under attack as the Vietnamese professed the
Mahayana branch of Buddhism. Everything Khmer, including
the darker color of the peoples skins, were looked down upon
by their Vietnamese overlords.
The proud Cambodians who constructed the temples of
Ankor Wat rose in rebellion in the mid-1840's with Thai
help and ejected the Vietnamese. The cultural shocks
imposed upon the Cambodians were to be transmitted to each
succeeding generation in the form of hatred for the yuen
(a term for the Vietnamese signifying barbarian) . Although
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Cambodia became a vassal to the Thais who perceived the
value of having a buffer state against an expansionist
Vietnam, the Thais never attempted a cultural conquest of
the Khmers. The rule of the country remained in the hands
of the Khmer ruling class and the cultural similarities
between the two peoples far outweighed the dissimilarities.
The French establishment of a protectorate in 1864
displaced Thai suzerainty prevented further Vietnamese
intrusions for the next 90 years. Still, the French
aggravated anti -Vietnamese sentiment in the country as the
French promoted Vietnamese immigration with the idea that
the more energetic Vietnamese race would displace the Khmers,
thereby encouraging economic advancement in Cambodia. The
Vietnamese provided most of the labor in the French rubber
plantations and much of the administrative staff in addition
to large numbers in other fields.
Under the French the Vietnamese comprised 50 percent of
Phnom Penh's population which was further divided into
25 percent Chinese and the remainder nature Khmers. The
Khmers questioned the loyalty of the Vietnamese emigres as
they refused to learn the language and were totally unassim-
ilable. Cambodian (Khmer) nationalists always feared that
Vietnamese as adjuncts to French colonialism, who someday
might become imperialists on their own account, seeking




B. KHMER- VIETNAMESE ANTAGONISMS, 1954-1975
The modern period of Khmer -Vietnamese antoganism began
with the Geneva accords of 1954. As part of the settlement
Prince Sehanouk was permitted to incorporate the Khmer
Rouge (Cambodian communists) into his Royal Cambodian army.
The Khmer Rouge would have preferred their own autonomous
territorial sector as the Communists in Laos (the Pathet Lao)
were granted. The Khmer Rouge, under their best known leader,
Pol Pot, felt that his cause was betrayed and that the revolu-
tionary struggle "dissolved into thin air through the Geneva
agreement." Throughout the 1950' s and the early 1960 's,
the Communist movements in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were
largely forced to go their separate ways.
A critical period for the Khmer Rouge-North Vietnamese
relations was in the mid-1960' s when Hanoi's actions appeared
more supportive of the anti -communist Sihanouk regime than
of the Communist Khmer Rouge. At that time, Sihanouk in-
stituted a crackdown on the resurgent Cambodian communists,
forcing them to scatter once again. Hanoi viewed the
process with passive acquiescence while it proceeded to
improve relations with the Sihanouk regime. By 1965 the
North Vietnamese were using sanctuaries in the Parrot's
Beak region of eastern Cambodia and the port, of Sihanouk -
ville (now Kompong Som) for the transport of arms reportedly
with Sihanouk's permission. This would have legitimized
a procedure that had been going on for several years.
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South Vietnamese officials estimated that two-thirds of
Communist-block shipments for the support of the Hanoi-led
National Liberation Front (NLF) over the years 1961-1964
were transported through Sihanoukville via Phnom Penh and
4
the Mekong. Hanoi's subsequent actions indicate that the
Prince's granting of sanctuaries to the North Vietnamese
was contingent upon Vietnam's bridling the activities of
the Khmer Rouge
.
According to a Khmer Rouge account, the break between
the National Liberation Front (NLF) in Vietnam and the
Khmer Rouge occurred in 1965 when the NLF tried to dissuade
the Cambodians from acting against the Sihanouk regime.
North Vietnam further attempted to persuade the Khmer Rouge
of the efficacy of the "Vietnam First" policy in which the
aims of all three Indo-Chinese states, as envisioned by
Hanoi, would be more quickly fulfilled by winning the war
in Vietnam first; after that revolution could be advanced
in Laos and in Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge say that in 196 7
and again in 1969 the Vietnamese, who were afraid of
jeopardizing their Cambodian sanctuaries, tried to pressure
the Khmer Rouge into accepting this policy. On the latter
occasion, Hanoi reportedly tried to intimidate the Pol Pot
7forces into acquiescence but failed. The Khmer Rouge saw
Vietnam's motives as being purely selfish- -as they had been
in 1954--and rejected Hanoi's demands for joint action
against the Americans and the South Vietnamese up until
Sihanouk's ouster from power by Lon Nol in March 19 70.
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Following Lon Nol's ascendance, a new era in "coopera-
tion" began between the Khmer Rouge and the NLF. The old
relationship that had existed between Sihanouk and Hanoi
was no longer possible with the Lon Nol regime. Inflama-
tory statements by the new government declaring that all
Vietnamese were Viet Cong resulted in the deaths of
hundreds of Vietnamese residents in Cambodia. The new
regime, fearing that Hanoi intended to annex portions of
Cambodia, repudiated Sinahouk's policy of granting sanc-
tuaries to the North Vietnamese thereby removing any inhi-
o
bition the Vietnamese may have had for attacking it.
From then on it was to Vietnam's advantage to encourage
Khmer Rouge activities against the Phnom Penh regime.
Hanoi willingly trained Khmer Rouge for the purpose of
making the Ho Chi Minh Trail secure and to insure that its
sanctuaries remained intact.
At best, the association between the Khmer Rouge and the
North Vietnamese over the next two years was a "marriage of
convenience." The Khmer Rouge, however, wanted to achieve
some assurance of Hanoi's support in exchange for its
providing security for Hanoi's western flank. Accordingly,
when the three Indo-Chinese Communist parties met in Canton
on 24-25 April 1970, it received Vietnam's pledge in a
treaty to continue the fight against imperalism until victory
9
was attained in all three Indo-Chinese countries. The
Khmer Rouge hoped that a written agreement would insure
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that Hanoi would never again negotiate a settlement
betraying Khmer interests.
Problems between the comrades-in-arms rose immediately
after their "alliance" in 1970. The Khmer Rouge leadership,
to the intense irritation of the North Vietnamese, strongly
opposed integration between the two Communist organizations
fearing Hanoi would try to undermine the independence of
the Khmer Rouge. Accordingly, the Cambodians refused to
allow Hanoi to engage in political organizational activities
on Cambodian soil involving Khmers or Vietnamese residents.
Tensions were evident over trivial matters such as the
prominence in which Ho Chi Minh's portrait was displayed.
On at least one occasion, in September 1970, open conflict
erupted when the Khmer Rouge fired from behind on Vietnamese
with whom they were fighting in a joint operation.
In Hanoi's view, Pol Pot was the instigator behind the
Khmer Rouge stance of independence from North Vietnam. As
early as 1953, Pol Pot (then Saloth Sar) and other Paris-
trained intellectuals returned to Cambodia where they
initiated an opposing faction to the pro-Hanoi Communists
who were then in charge. Pol Pot achieved leadership after
Touch Samut died of mysterious causes, marking the end of
the pro-Vietnam line. The first test for the new leader-
ship was in 1965 when, as has already been mentioned, the




Unfriendly relations between the Pol Pot-led Khmer Rouge
and Hanoi possibly induced Hanoi to back Sihanouk for leader-
ship in a united front against Lon Nol. Pham Van Dong
himself in April 1970 went to China to convince the Chinese
that Sihanouk was the only one capable of gaining broad-
based support to permit the eventual success of the revolu-
tion in Cambodia. At the same time, Pham Hung was sent~to
persuade Pol Pot of the tactical advantages that could be
derived from this association. Neither China nor the Khmer
Rouge was enthusiastic about placing Sihanouk in a position
of authority as his anti -Khmer Rouge stance was bitterly
remembered. The Khmer Rouge were also wary of the fact
that Sihanouk and the Vietnamese had developed a modus
vivendi through years of cooperation. Notably, Sihanouk
had convened a conference including the NLF and Hanoi in
March 1965 to find a formula for some sort of federation
of Indo-Chinese peoples. Though Sihanouk was accepted
in April 1970 as the symbolic head of forces against the
Lon Nol regime, he was placed under close surveillance in
an effort to prevent the opportunistic prince from con-
cretizing his association with North Vietnam. The Khmer
Rouge were aware that Sihanouk was like a two-edged sword;
his popularity could be either used for or against them.
Subsequent to Sihanouk's appointment, Hanoi tried to
reassert control over the Khmer Rouge but to Hanoi's chagrin,
the same faction that managed to survive the Sihanouk-led
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anti-communist campaign in the 1960 's again demonstrated
its resiliency by maintaining control over the Khmer Rouge. 16
After all else had failed, the next logical step was for
North Vietnam to try to assassinate the recalcitrant Pol
Pot. According to a Khmer Rouge account, assassination was
indeed attempted in November 1970 when Pol Pot and Nuon Chea
were targets of an unsuccessful poisoning plot while they
• • . . 17
were visiting in Hanoi.
The next critical stage in relations between the two
Communist parties came in 1972 when the U.S. and North
Vietnam began formal negotiations to end the Vietnam War.
At that time Kissinger was in China while President Podgorny
of the U.S.S.R. was in Hanoi attempting to work out the
details for a final settlement. Subsequent secret negotia-
tions in early 1973 between North Vietnam and the U.S.
reportedly achieved Vietnamese acceptance to pull out of
Cambodia with the end of the war in Vietnam. Hanoi was
given financial inducements to adhere to the agreements in
19the form of massive reconstruction aid. North Vietnam
tried to gain the Khmer Rouge's acceptance of a negotiated
settlement with the Lon Nol regime for the aim of setting
up a coalition government in Cambodia. However, the Khmer
Rouge were optimistic of achieving imminent victory and
were unwilling to postpone indefinitely their final success.
Hanoi and the U.S. signed the Paris Peace accords in April
1973. Once again the Khmer Rouge had been betrayed by
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Vietnam who had just three years earlier piously pledged to
20fight to the end.
Actual fighting between the NLF and the Khmer Rouge
broke out in 1972 and continued all the while the Pol Pot
Khmer Rouge forces struggled to take over Phnom Penh.
Although the NLF and the Khmer Rouge were ostensibly united
in victory over the Americans and the South Vietnamese, the
NLF was not happy to see the Pol Pot-led Khmer Rouge faction
take over Phnom Penh. The NLF slowed, then discontinued
transporting vital supplies to Pol Pot. This lack of
support proved key in two military engagements against Phnom
Penh in April 1973 and in January 1972. These abortive
battles resulted in the deaths of more than one-third of
Pol Pot's entire army and left the Khmer Rouge to suffer
alone during the frightful raids of the American B-52's on
21the Cambodian capitol.
Perhaps not coincidentally , Vietnamese logistics support
to Cambodia ended after an early Summer 1973 meeting in
Moscow between Pham Van Dong and Le Duan representing Vietnam
and Secretary Brezhnev of the U.S.S.R. A July 1973 FEER
report claims that Brezhnev told the Vietnamese leaders that
he approved of Hanoi's discontinuing assistance to the Khmer
Rouge. Sihanouk, lamenting the situation, in September 1973
complained that "North Vietnam has withdrawn its caches of
arms from Cambodia to South Vietnam, so we no longer have
2 3
access to them." The Khmer reaction must have been dis-
belief and perhaps even bitterness.
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In the extensive NLF-Khmer Rouge hostilities in 1973,
refugee reports indicate that hundreds from both sides
were killed in an area of eastern Cambodia where the Viet-
namese retained sanctuaries. The fighting was so intense
that it disrupted North Vietnamese infiltration into South
Vietnam and reduced the number of ittacks on government
outposts in the month of July. One refugee reported that
a new group of Khmer Rouge soldiers entered the region
prior to the outbreak of fighting and demanded the swift
evacuation of Vietnamese troops in the region. The influx
of trusted Khmer cadres to implement the new Cambodian line--
probably promulgated during a Summer 1973 session of the
Khmer Rouge National Congress- -signified that the Khmers
were worried about Vietnamese influence in the area and
within Khmer forces. After the eruption of hostilities,
which in one case began with a Khmer Rouge attempt to
intercept scarce rice supplies, Khmer cadres urged the people'
to rise up to oust the Vietnamese who had come "to live in
our country like parasites." The Khmer Rouge claimed that
the Vietnamese "would eventually eat up all our rice without
doing any good for Cambodia." Another prevalent theme was
that the Vietnamese were occupying territory that it did
not plan to leave.
The Khmer Rouge's eventual success over the remnant pro-
American Lon Nol forces was not due to North Vietnamese aid
as is sometimes asserted but to Chinese support that was
accelerated in the Summer of 1974. Shawcross speculates
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that the U.S.'s unwillingness to negotiate with Sihanouk
brought the Chinese to accept the military solution.
This was during the general decline in relations between
Vietnam and China as described above. China's active
support for Cambodia may have marked both a decision by
China to support the Pol Pot regime against Vietnamese-led
factions and the beginnings of Chinese suspicion of Hanoi's
ties with the U.S.S.R. In early 1975 the Khmer Rouge once
again found itself outside the gates of Phnom Penh and again
there was a battlefield lull; this time, however, the story
would have a different ending. While the North Vietnamese
were gearing up its Soviet-planned invasion against South
Vietnam, Ieng Sary in early March ventured to Peking where
he obtained the necessary arms to breach the defenses of
Phnom Penh. The capital fell on 17 April 1975 and with
it Hanoi's ability to gain Khmer Rouge acceptance of an
Indo-Chinese Federation by peaceful means. Hanoi missed
its opportunity of gaining influence over Cambodia by its
failure to provide military aid at critical junctures.
After April 1975 China gained ascendance as the benefactor
for Cambodia.
Indicating the new close association with Peking, the
victory statements made by the new regime were effusive
in their praise for China declaring, "The victory of the
Cambodian people is the same as the victory of the Chinese."
North Korea and North Vietnam were thanked for their support
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but the U.S.S.R. was slighted in public statements, and
its offices in Phnom Penh were ransacked. The Soviets
paid for their lack of political and economic support
(evident in its non-recognition of the Khmer Rouge until
the last moment) by finding its officials along with most
2 8
other countries' representatives, ejected from Cambodia.
The Cambodians also made it clear that they did their own
fighting to achieve victory. Chau Sang, a special repre-
sentative of Sihanouk said that press reports in 1970,
1971, and 1973 claiming that North Vietnamese troops fought
with the Khmer Rouge were erroneous. He stated that at no
29
time did the North Vietnamese fulfill a combatant role.
When the Vietnamese fought in Cambodia, it was for their
own parochial needs, i.e., securing the Ho Chi Minh Trail,
and not for achieving Khmer Rouge victory. The Khmer Rouge
later claimed that it was they who helped the Vietnamese to
30
victory and not the other way around. Indeed, they pro-
vided security for the Ho Chi Minh Trail and Cambodians
trained by the Vietnamese fought in the final campaigns in
South Vietnam. The Khmer Rouge also helped to procure rice
for the Vietnamese; Ieng Sary reportedly lived clandestinely
31
in Phnom Penh in 1968-1970 for that purpose. Even the
rapid increase in Khmer Rouge forces from a mere few
thousand to over 50,000 from 1970 cannot be attributed
entirely to Vietnamese recruiting and training efforts.
Already in 1968 the Khmer Rouge had developed a viable
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guerrilla force of its own. American bombing of Cambodia
in 1970 caused an extensive blacklash against the Lon Nol
regime and a concomitant increase in the numbers within the
Khmer Rouge ranks.
In summary, the relations between the Cambodian Khmer
Rouge and the Vietnamese NLF before April, 1975, were not
conducive for post-war cooperation between the communist
countries. The "special relationship" that Hanoi professed
to have existed during that time period was more a product
of wishful thinking rather than the actual state of affairs.
Instead of the benevolent all/ that it tried to paint
itself, Hanoi was untrustworthy and selfish in its relations
with the Khmer Rouge. Historical fears resulting from over
two and one-half centuries of Vietnamese expansionism at
the expense of Cambodia and the Khmer people dictated Khmer
Rouge resistance to Hanoi's efforts to place Cambodia in a
subordinate status and its intransigence against Vietnamese
territorial demands. Vietnam's continuing occupation of
border areas in Cambodia generated the suspicion that Hanoi's
leaders would follow in the steps of its predecessors to
incorporate Cambodian territory into Vietnam.
C. VIETNAMESE -CAMBODIAN RELATIONS, 1975-1977
After April 1975 sovereignty , defined by Webster's New
World Dictionary as "supreme and independent political
authority" was the main issue dividing Cambodia and Vietnam.
Cambodia declared that its relations with any country would
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be based on equality and independence and rejected a sub-
ordinate status in any proposed Hanoi-led Indo-Chinese
Federation. Historical factors militated against any
association that would undermine Khmer national identity.
Vietnam, on the other hand, insisted that the two countries
shared a "special relationship" and therefore rejected
Cambodia's stance of independence and hence its right of
sovereignty.
It is a logical assumption that Hanoi's pre-1975 efforts
to undermine the Pol Pot leadership which adamantly refused
to become an integral part of the Vietnamese empire con-
tinued during the 1975-1977 time frame when a series of
attempted coups and revolts wracked Cambodia. Hanoi's
actions against Phnom Penh were necessarily on a limited
scale short of total war because Vietnam had to first con-
sider the consolidation of the two halves of Vietnam. Hanoi
could not subjugate Cambodia until its own internal opposi-
tion was sufficiently quelled. Vietnam moved rapidly in
1976 towards consolidation, and by early 1977 its internal
problems were sufficiently under control to permit military
action against Cambodia. Border conflicts that continuously
plagued the two countries would then, in April 1977, become
the excuse for Vietnamese "retaliation." As could be
expected, both China and the Soviet Union had parts to play
in the determination of Cambodia's fate.
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Several events beginning in September 1975 pointed
ominously to a Vietnamese incursion against Cambodia later
that year. Concomitantly, Thailand became the focus of
respective Chinese and Vietnamese diplomatic and coercive
efforts
.
Tenuous evidence suggests the fate of Cambodia was
discussed during Le Duan's visit to Peking in September
1975. Coincident with his arrival was a propitious message
by Laos--significantly the first of its kind--tracing the
birth of the Laotian Com-unist Party to 1955 when, Laos
said the party was created in the "spirit of an Indo-
32Chinese Federation." Vietnam had failed in its use of
coercion against Cambodia and was perhaps attempting to
win, with Laotian support, China's acceptance for such an
association through negotiation. If this hypothesis is
correct, the threat of Vietnam's joining the Soviet camp
could have formed the basis for negotiation with China to
achieve a Federation of Indo-Chinese states. That type of
bargaining, however, would not have had much impact on the
Chinese who by that time concluded Vietnma had joined in
an alliance with the Soviets.
As if to confirm speculation that Cambodia's fate was
in the balance, Sihanouk on October 6 in a United Nations
address reaffirmed Cambodia's stance that it was a neutral
and independent country and intended to remain so. He
announced that Cambodia would not join any organization
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other than the United Nations and the non-aligned. Signifi-
cantly, Sihanouk's statement precluded Cambodia's membership
in an Indo-Chinese Federation, a fact Hanoi probably noted
with irritation. Sihanouk also declared that Cambodia "does
reserve its right to defend itself from force of arms if it
is the victim of attack or aggression." 33 Although Cambodia
was to have problems with Thailand in the future, it is note
worthy that relations with that country at this time were on
the upswing, culminating in normalization of relations on
October 31. The aggression Sihanouk was referring to, there
fore, was from another quarter.
Cambodia may have had its last chance to form a closer
association with Laos and Vietnam in mid-October when a
conference of the three Indo-Chinese states was held in Laos
It may have been coincidental, but following this meeting
Thai-Laotian border problems significantly escalated and
Hanoi appeared to be making preparations for battle with
Cambodia
.
Refugee reports in mid-October ominously indicated a
buildup of Vietnamese forces along the Vietnamese-Cambodian
border. Possibly as a guise for future action Hanoi broad-
casts began to harrangue against members of the former
34
Saigon regime which continued to resist communist rule.
Some of these anti-Hanoi forces were known to operate along
the border with Cambodia thus affording North Vietnam a
35
convenient excuse for mobilizing forces in the region.
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Various considerations made the end of 1975 a logical
time for Vietnam to engage in an incursion against Cambodia.
The break with China in September undermined the remaining
pro-Peking forces within the Vietnamese communist party
thereby reducing the influence of those within Vietnam who
would urge moderation in Vietnam's dealings with China and
its allies.
A second factor was that Pol Pot had not consolidated
his position throughout the country and pro-Vietnamese
cadres remained in sufficient number to lead a viable revolt
of the disgruntled segments of the population. As late as
1978, Pol Pot declared that one percent of the Cambodian
population, or 40,000 to 60,000 persons based on a population
of 4-6 million persons were anti-regime elements (down from
between one to two percent in 1977) . Undoubtedly the per-
centage of disaffected Cambodians was much higher in 1975
when there were numerous Lon Nol sympathizers extant in the
country. Vietnam need only to keep its part in the matter
secret and it could utilize the anti-communist remnants in
Cambodia as well as the pro-Vietnamese cadres. Despite the
favorable climate, the anti-Pol Pot revolt never got off
the ground possible because of the alliance structure the
Chinese were able to build for the Cambodians and Vietnam's
inability to play a decisive role.
Vietnam endeavored unsuccessfully to intimidate Thailand
through Laos. Thailand has historically sought to have
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Cambodia as a buffer state against Vietnamese expansionism.
The Vietnamese realized this proclivity and attempted to
prevent the natural alignment between Cambodia and Thailand
by intimidation and by focusing Thai attention on difficulties
along the Thai-Laotian border. To Vietnam's advantage
practically every attempt by Cambodia to improve relations
with Thailand was marred by simultaneous border conflicts
which had the effect of deterring a mutual understanding
between the two countries. Although the source of these
conflicts has not been positively determined, Thailand
strongly suspected the Vietnamese.
The closeness of the Vietnamese-Laotian association makes
it logical for one to assume Vietnam was also behind the
Thai-Laotian border conflicts. Vientiane's hearty support
for an Indo-Chinese Federation has already been referred to.
Laos also echoed Vietnam's demands for reparations and
supported Hanoi's attempts to eliminate U.S. presence in
Southeast Asia. The personal tie cannot be overemphasized
as much of Vientiane's leadership was educated in Hanoi and
37
many Pathet Lao leaders had Vietnamese wives. The extent
of Vietnam's influence over Laos is indicated in the
suggestion that the policy of Laos was being made by an
Indochinese Communist Party (dominated by Vietnam) for
7 O
Laotians to implement. If true, it would be extremely
unlikely that Laos would instigate problems with Thailand
without Hanoi's blessing. Similarly, it would be difficult
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to reject Soviet complicity in the Thai-Laotian border
problems as the Laos government openly confessed its
belief that the U.S.S.R. was the "correct leadership" for
39
world communism. Since Laos ascribed to the leadership
of Hanoi and Moscow, it is agreeable that all three commu-
nist elements were not averse to the continuation of the
embarrassing border conflicts between Laos and Thailand.
Skirmishes along the Thai-Laotian border evident
throughout the summer of 1975 rose in intensity immediately
following the mid-October meeting of the Indo-Chinese
states. Every attempt by Thailand to ameliorate the situa-
tion was rebuffed, including proposals to redefine the
borders, requests for negotiations on outstanding issues,
and assurances by Thailand that it wanted to be a good
neighbor. No response was likely as tensions were
contrived by the Pathet Lao who endeavored to inflame
ancient animosities by referring to an emerald buddha that
the Thais absconded from a Lao temple in 1778 and fourteen
Laotian provinces which were incorproated into Thai terri-
41tory that same year.
On 17 November the border problems reached a climax
when a Thai gunboat was sunk and the Thais retaliated ;vith
bombing raids. Prime Minister Kukrit, who steadfastly
tried to improve relations with all communist countries in
the region accused a third country, meaning Hanoi, of in-




and Thailand. The Thai ambassador to Vietnam was subse-
quently recalled and repercussions were felt by Vietnamese
residents in Thailand in the form of anti-Vietnamese
rioting in Nong Khai , a town in the area where the incidents
43
occurred. Prime Minister Kukrit accused Hanoi of violating
its pledge not to interfere in Thailand's internal affairs




The closure of the border created havoc on the Laotian
economy which relied heavily on the Thais for the transport
of vital commodities. Consequently an economic mission
from Vientiane to Hanoi requested emergency aid which
resulted in a Soviet-Vietnamese airlift of necessities.
By late December Laos was feeling the severity of the
effects from the blockade and asked foreign missions in
Vientiane to help persuade Bangkok to resume traffic in
Laos.
4 On January 1, 1976 Thailand lifted the blockade
with Laos as a New Year's Day gift and a gesture for improved
i *• 46relations.
Vietnam's strategy behind the Thai-Laotian border problems
backfired as it forced the Vietnamese rather than the Thais
to focus attention on Laos. The strategy also failed to
dissuade Thailand from consolidating its ties with Cambodia
and China.
In the midst of the Thai-Laotian border disputes
Thailand, with Chinese help, was improving its relations with
Cambodia. This, of course, was just what the Vietnamese
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were trying to avert. On October 20 a Chinese delegation
arrived in Bangkok probably to arrange normalization of
relations between Cambodia and Thailand and to brief the
Thais on the state of relations between China and Vietnam
as well as between China and Cambodia. Illustrating China's
involvement, Ieng Sary representing Cambodia arrived in
Thailand on October 28 via a Chinese Boeing 707 which was
dispatched especially for the purpose. The Soviets, who
also wanted to prevent Thailand's entente with the Chinese
and Cambodians, accused the Chinese of supporting the CPT
and of proselytizing workers in Thai cities due to its
47failure to make advances in the countryside. The Soviet
Union was undoubtedly cognizant of the fact that Hanoi-
-
not Peking- -was responsible for the increased activity by
urban insurgents and was obviously trying to deter closer
Thai association with China and hence Cambodia, by accusing
China of playing a two-faced game--pretending friendship
with the Thai government while secretly supporting Thai
insurgents. The Thais, however, refused to believe that
the Chinese had anything to do with stirring up guerrilla
activity and Kukrit made clear his conviction that it was
Vietnam and not China which supported insurgents with arms
and training.
Thailand made a last attempt to show toleration towards
Laos and its Vietnamese teacher by a long and rhetoric
offer of friendship. The Thai initiative was answered
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by further hostilities along the Thai-Laos border. This
rebuff spurred the Thais to improve relations with China
and Cambodia and prompted Thais to seek a U.S. delay in
its scheduled pullout from Thai bases, originally slated
for Sprin 1976. 50
The Chinese, meanwhile, used the means at its disposal
to deter Vietnamese expansionism. In addition to giving
assistance to Cambodia, China also resurrected the
Paracels/Spratlys issue to remind Vietnam that it had
Peking's feelings to consider when Hanoi advanced its ties
with the Soviet Union. During and after Le Duan's visit to
Peking in September 1975, China firmed its claims to the
Paracels, Pratas , Macclesfield Bank and the Spratlys in a
most detailed manner. Chinese naval exercises in the
South China Sea during the Fall of 1975 and swift Chinese
reactions to ships that wrecked on the Paracels in December
illustrated that the Chinese navy could exert credible
pressure against the Spratlys and the Vietnamese coast if
the need arose.
The Chinese strategy in using the Spratlys to deter
Vietnamese expansion was in part blunted by the Soviets
who wanted to make sure that the split between the Chinese
and the Vietnamese would not be healed. On November 22
Pravda accused China of exhibiting its expansionist
policies by claiming the Spratlys and Paracels which "the
53
Vietnamese people consider their own territory."
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Presumably, by this time Soviet atlases had been changed
to ahow Vietnamese rather than Chinese sovereignty over
those islands. In response to Soviet goading, the Chinese
said the U.S.S.R. was trying to "stir up" Vietnamese
antagonism to China by backing the Vietnamese claim and
reasserted its determination to recover the Spratlys which
were part of China's "sacred territory." Hanoi entered
the verbal battles by asserting that the Vietnamese army
was "ready to accept any mission anywhere," and to "go as
far as the border areas and sea islands to maintain the
security of the fatherland."
The Soviets saw the opportunity to deepen the Sino-
Vietnamese rift by declaring that the Chinese never were
willing to see the reunification of Vietnam and cited
Nguyen Cao Ky ' s claim that in 1972 he was offered financial
aid by the Chinese to organize a coup d-etat in Saigon for
neutralization of South Vietnam. The U.S.S.R. 's emphasis
on this point brought into sharp contrast the policies of
China and the Soviet Union towards Vietnam. China, on the
one hand, was perceived by Vietnam as doing everything in
its power to prevent Vietnam's "manifest destiny" of winning
ascendance in an Indo-Chinese Federation and in Southeast
Asia, while the Soviets were not only backing up the Vietnamese
in its claims for the Paracels and Spratlys, it was also
supportive of Vietnam's aims throughout Southeast Asia.
The Soviet's support for Vietnam encouraged Hanoi's
bellicosity towards Cambodia and China by removing much of the
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moderating influence China might have had over Vietnam.
Without Soviet support, Vietnam might have been more
responsive to China's position in the Spratlys and more
inclined to discuss with China the problem of Cambodia.
Encouraged by Soviet support, Vietnam in early 1976 issued
a new official map which included both the Paracels and
57 —the Spratlys. In the same timeframe, Hanoi in all prob-
ability participated in an attempted coup in Cambodia
aimed at eliminating a regime hostile to the Vietnamese.
Despite the accelerating tensions with China, Vietnam
showed that it had no intention to accede to China's wishes
and abandon its goals in Indo-China.
Vietnam did try, however, to improve its relations with
ASEAN, thereby neutralizing as far as possible local
opposition to its possible expansionist schemes. Vietnam
modified its earlier criticisms of ASEAN as a stage of
U.S. imperalism and assured its neighbors that it would
abandon its earlier support of guerrilla movements in the
various countries. At least as a temporary expedient, Vietnam
professed its acceptance of ASEAN's vision of Southeast
5 8
Asia as a zone of "independence, peace and neutrality."
On July 12 Hanoi established relations with the
Philippines and immediately thereafter Deputy Foreign Minister
Phan Hien began a goodwill tour of Malaysia, Singapore and
Indonesian. In a radical departure from its bitter denuncia-
tions of Thailand just a month before, Vietnam accepted an
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invitation from Thailand to engage in talks aimed at
59
normalization of relations. Not surprisingly, Vietnam's
move to improve relations with Thailand was followed by-
Laotian actions to do the same. On August 3 Thailand and
Laos issued a joint communique aimed at resolving border
disputes between the two countries. Just three days
later, on August 6, Thailand and Vietnam agreed to estab-
lish relations sometime in the near future.
While Vietnam would occasionally lapse into caustic
tirades against ASEAN in an attempt to sway the members
at critical junctures, relations between ASEAN and Vietnam
were, after July 1976, thanks to worsened Sino-Vietnamese
relations, on a much more harmonious level than previously.
Behind the facade of friendship, Vietnam continued to
support guerrilla movements, and assumed an open hostile
stance toward Thailand when in October 1976 a strongly anti-
communist military junta assumed power in Bangkok.
D. ATTEMPTED COUPS AND INVASION, 19 76
With the passing months of 1976, the S.R.V. was no longer
content with mere diplomatic maneuvers to isolate Cambodia
or with military measures to strengthen its control over the
disputed Cambodia-Vietnam border areas. The S.R.V. partici-
pated in periodic attempted coups and revolts throughout
1976 and 1977 which created massive disorder within Cambodia
and contributed to the radicalization of Cambodia's internal
and external policies. The resultant world antipathy toward
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Cambodia facilitated Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia by
allowing Hanoi to disguise its act of aggression as a
humanitarian gesture to relieve the world of the barbaric
Pol Pot regime.
The source of insurrections in Cambodia cannot be de-
fensively determined although the pattern of Khmer Rouge-
Vietnamese relations strongly implicates Hanoi. At various
times the Cambodians accused the Khmer Serai (the remnants
of the Lon Nol supporters) , the CIA and Vietnam of insti-
gating the upheavals. The degree of U.S. involvement cannot
be ascertained, but it would seem illogical for either the
CIA or the anti-communist Khmer Serai to engage in coup
attempts to replace one communist regime with another.
Unlike the Khmer Serai which was constrained by a lack of
financial support, Vietnam not only had the motive but it
had the means represented by pro-Hanoi communists that
remained a viable presence in Cambodia. These pro-Hanoi
communists took every advantage of factional struggles
within the Cambodia communist party. The Vietnamese
communists, supported by their Cambodia collaborators,
accused Pol Pot of creating border tensions with the Viet-
namese in order to outmaneuver his pro-Hanoi Cambodian
opponents. Vietnam gave active support to indigenous
forces within Cambodia in order to put a client regime in
power in Phnom Penh.
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According to refugees from Battambang and Oddar
Meanchey provinces who were directly involved in anti-Pol Pot
activities, pro-Hanoi anti-Pol Pot plotting was continuous
from the time Pol Pot established himself in 1975
.
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Refugees fleeing Cambodia across the border to Vietnam
were reportedly being welcomed with covering fire by Viet-
namese border guards. Previous to that time it had been
Vietnam's policy to turn back refugees. Vietnam may have
begun at that time to recruit refugees for use in a counter-
insurgency force to fight within Cambodia. Refugees who
showed a willingness to accept Vietnamese leadership were
molded into Cambodian-Vietnamese units in preparation for
coup-related action in Phnom Penh. Anti-regime elements
were operating along the entire length of Cambodia's
borders, as well as in guerrilla units in Cambodia's
. . - 66interior.
A Livre Noir account of attempted coups in Phnom Penh
in early 1976 identified one leader as ChaKrey, an anti-
Pol Pot commander of Khmer Rouge forces south of Prey Veng
province, an area adjacent to Vietnam. Interestingly,
this region of Cambodia was also the operating grounds of
So Phim who in the latter half of 1978 led pro-Hanoi in-
surgents against the Pol Pot regime. Cha Krey's task was
to assassinate the Khmer Rouge leadership while, in the
midst of diversionary activity in the western province of
Siem Reap, an invasion would be launched from outside the
f\ 7
country. The coup was reported, but it failed.
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Sihanouk may have been one of the first to feel the
repercussions of the attempted coup. On March 21 Sihanouk
was unanimously elected to the Khmer National Assembly as a
representative of Phnom Penh. On April 4, just two weeks
after he assumed his posts, Sihanouk mysteriously resigned
as head of state and began a hibernation that lasted until
the end of 1977. Sihanouk's speedy departure may have been
due to his lost support of his Chinese patrons, i.e.,
Chou En-lai who died earlier in the year and Teng Hsiao-ping
who was on the verge of a forced political sabbatical; Teng
was relieved of his duties on April 7 following early April
68
riots in Peking. Or, as seems more likely, he may have
been removed because of his possible connection with anti-
Pol Pot pro-Hanoi Cambodian plotters.
The possibility that Sihanouk aligned himself with Hanoi
and pro-Hanoi communists cannot be discounted. The first
part of Chapter IV discussed the special relationship that
Sihanouk and Hanoi had developed during the Prince's tenure
to 1970. If such an association had reemerged it could
explain why the Khmer Rouge leadership was so averse to
having Sihanouk go to Hanoi to discuss the fate of Cambodia
in 1978-1979. They may have feared a Sihanouk sellout to
Hanoi in order to return Sihanouk to power. Khmer Rouge
elements who favored closer association with Hanoi, though
probably having no special affection for the Vietnamese,
may have viewed an Indo-Chinese Federation in partnership
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with Vietnam as the only means to retain Khmer independence.
A strong leader with popular support would be more likely
to prevent the total subjugation of Cambodia while keeping
the expansionist Vietnamese at bay; cooperation with Vietnam,
therefore, may have been viewed as a necessary evil. Khmer
Rouge refugees intimately involved in the anti -regime
plotting offer some support for the view.
Following Sihanouk's removal from his posts and the con-
comitant purge of Khmer Rouge officials in April, Vietnam
once again reversed its policies to the Cambodian refugees,
69this time forcing them to return to Cambodia. This
apparently conciliatory gesture may have been timed to take
advantage of the unsettled political climates in both China
and Cambodia. Vietnam may have hoped that it could exert
more influence over the existing leadership in Cambodia who
might have been more amenable to Vietnamese requests while
China was immersed in its own affairs. Pro-Hanoi communists
had reportedly made inroads into the ruling clique and many
pro-Peking members were among those eliminated from power.
Notably, So Phim who was to gain notoriety for leading pro-
Hanoi communists in insurrection against Phnom Penh in 1978
70
assumed the position of Vice President at this time.
Whatever Vietnam's reasons for its change in refugee
policy, it was soon evident that the post-purge Cambodian
leadership had not significantly changed its stance towards
Vietnam. May 1976 border talks between the two countries
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ended in failure as Cambodia refused to give up an inch of
its territory to the Vietnamese. The Cambodians claimed
that the Vietnamese had presented a map which, if accepted,
would have allowed the Vietnamese to claim sovereignty over
a large chunk of Cambodia's sea territory. Perhaps
because of Vietnam's failure in negotiations with Cambodia,
Vietnma may have decided to place renewed emphasis on sub-
version to undermine the Pol Pot regime.
In May 1976, according to refugee reports, border
patrols under renegade Khmer Rouge officers were instructed
to ignore Phnom Penh's directives calling for more vigilance
72
to prevent the enemy from entering Cambodian territory.
Due to the proximity in time between the failure of Vietnamese
Cambodian border talks and the new directives , Cambodia may
have been referring to Vietnam or Hanoi's agents as the enemy
to be looked for. Rebel leaders instructed the border patrols
to disregard border occurrences and told them to quit plating
punf
i
sticks and land mines which had the dual purpose of
preventing refugees from departing and enemies from entering
73Cambodian territory. Dismantled border defenses would
allow both pro-Hanoi elements and Khmer Serai forces to
enter Cambodian territory with inpunity creating more havoc
than their limited numbers would normally produce. Because
anti-Pol Pot forces were known to operate from Thai terri-
tory, the increase in border activity would be blamed on the
Thais, postponing an understanding between the two countries.
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Events in the latter half of 1976 added to the momentum
leading to the confrontation between Cambodia and Vietnam.
In September 1976 Pol Pot reportedly got word of the plotting
, . .74
against his regime. Perhaps as a result he disappeared
for a period of time possibly to avoid assassination while
he worked to determine who was behind the plots. 75 Besides
having to contend with internal subversion, by late 1976 the
Cambodian regime found itself surrounded on all sides by
hostile elements. Unfortunately for Cambodia's world image,
it began to act more and more like the embattled state that
it was while Vietnam escaped any share of blame for Cambodia's
tragedy. Much later Vietnam would be perceived as the victim
of hostilities from China, a paranoic state, though in truth
Cambodia was the victim of circumstances which in all proba-
bility were orchestrated by Hanoi.
Both Thailand and Laos hardened their positions towards
Cambodia in the latter half of 1976. In October the fervently
anti-communist General Thanin assumed power in a military
coup d'etat following rioting at a Bangkok university. The
Thais accused Vietnam of instigating the violence claiming
that Vietnamese and Soviet articles were found on campus.
Regardless, Thanin did much to undermine the policy of
detente with communist states instituted by his predecessors.
Border problems already destined to worsen due to the
presence of rebel Khmer Rouge soldiers were bound to deteriorate
with an intolerant regime in power in Thailand.
77

The downturn in Cambodian-Vietnamese relations was
paralleled by increasing tensions between Laos and Cambodia.
In the end of 1976 Laos stopped sending back refugees to
Cambodia when, Laos claimed, it "realized that all returned
refugees had been executed." Vietnam's periodic displays of
"benevolence" in accepting refugees marked concomitant
attempts by Hanoi to undermine the Cambodian regime. Perhaps
Laos was employing similar tactics. Cambodia's reaction
was to strengthen its borders by digging trenches and
planting land mines while border guards took occasional
i f\
shots to keep people away.
Meanwhile Vietnam was moving rapidly to consolidate
the socialist north with the capitalist south while pro-
Chinese elements were isolated and eliminated from power.
Elections were held in early April 1976 to unite the
77
country as speedily as possible. Subsequently, Hanoi
increased its measures to ferret out the remaining pro-
Saigon forces, warning members of the former regime that
they would be exterminated if they continued to oppose
u • 78Hanoi
.
In June 1976, when war between the S.R.V. and China
was no longer viewed as being impossible, Le Duan declared
that Vietnma would be more rapidly socialized. The stringent
internal policies Vietnam instituted at this time contrasted
markedly with Hanoi's move in July to improve relations with
ASEAN. 79 It was the ethnic Chinese that bore the brunt of
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the new Vietnamese policies. In August an economic decree
was issued applying to all businesses that made over ten
percent profit since the fall of Saigon. Profits were
subject to an initial tax of 80 percent increasing to
100 percent retroactive to July. Though all businesses
were affected, the Chinese were especially hurt and believed
80
to be the targets of the new decree.
When Mao Tse-tung died in September 1976, a temporary
lull occurred in the stormy Sino-Vietnamese relations.
Hua Kuo-feng personally requested assistance from the
8
1
Vietnamese to help preserve the body. In early December
Vietnames Vice Premier Do Muoi received a cordial welcome
in Peking, which was seen as indicative of a thaw in
8 2
relations between China and Vietnam.
Despite the temporarily improved climate between China
and Vietnam, Vietnam eliminated eight pro-Chinese members
from the party's central committee, including former
ambassadors to China and members of ethnic groups having
power bases in northern Vietnam along the Sino-Vietnamese
border. Notably, Hoang Van Hoan, a former ambassador to
Peking who gained fame for defecting from Vietnam in July
1979 and a vocal critic of Le Duan ' s pro-Soviert policies,
8 3
was one of the casualties of the December purge. This
anti-Chinese behavior in the midst of a general improvement
of Sino-Vietnamese relations evidences the ambivalence in
the evolving policies of the S.R.V.
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At this same time, early December 1976, Vietnam also
moved to neutralize the pro-Chinese ethnic groups that
lined the border with China and Vietnam. Autonomous zones
were abolished and attempts were made to step up their
integration into Vietnam both economically and politically.
Ethnic Chinese left Vietnam in great numbers as discrimi-
nation intensified in the restricted zones along the Sino-
8 5Vietnamese border.
In possible preparation for a military campaign, General
Giap visited the Soviet Union in March 1977. Though reportedly
on an economic mission, Giap obtained Marshal Ustinov's pledge
to help M the Vietnam People's Army strengthen its combat
capacity." The Soviet Union's Army Chief of Staff also
averred that "active and unified action of the socialist
countries is very important and necessary" to counter
"imperialist action." Although this statement pointed
towards a partnership between the two countries , Giap did
not see Secretary Brezhnev, President Podgorny or Premier
8 7
Kosygin during his visit to the Soviet Union. It is
possible the Soviet leadership did not want to associate
itself publicly with actions the Vietnamese might take
against Cambodia.
Another development in April 1977 sent off signals of
a possible Vietnamese aggressive action. A report originat-
ing from the State Department and the Pentagon indicated
that Vietnam had decided against selling weapons captured
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weapons captured after the fall of Saigon. Reportedly,
Vietnam also declined to provide weaponry to insurgency
movements in Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. 88
This decision against the sale of weapons to Asian and
African governments may have reflected two considerations:
first, to influence opinion in the U.S. for normal U.S.-
S.R.V. relations and second, to maintain maximum military
capability for itself.
Vietnamese-U.S. relations underwent a marked improve-
ment during the early months of the Carter Administration.
The timing of the Washington disclosure mentioned above,
just a few days prior to the May 3rd opening of talks
between the U.S. and Vietnam in Paris, may have been an
effort to improve the climate for negotiations. Possibly
in reciprocation for Vietnam's concessions on arms sales
and its announced decision to make more vigorous efforts
to determine the fate of Americans missing in action in
Vietnam, the U.S. on May 4th agreed not to block Vietnam's
admission into the United Nations. In early May Vietnam
began to prepare its people for apparently imminent
89
normalization of relations with the U.S.
E. S.R.V. -CAMBODIAN HOSTILITIES, 1977
All the diplomatic maneuvers of the S.R.V. and the
secret meddling in the internal affairs of Cambodia may
well have been a diplomatic prelude to the invasion which
later occurred. The timing was at least partially determined
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by the growing crises in Phnom Penh. On January 20, 1977,
one phase of the plot against the Pol Pot regime which had
been germinating since late 1975 was scheduled to be
launched. According to a FEER report, "the plan was to
recruit as many soldiers and civilians as possible in the
provinces along with Battambang and Oddar Meanchey provinces
which had already been infiltrated by insurgents spanned the
breadth of Cambodia. The extent of this insurgency could
be seen by the fact that in Oddar Meanchey province alone
thirty-five chiefs of villages, communes and districts met
to plan the overthow of the Pol Pot regime. The plot was
foiled, however, when a messenger between rebel forces in
Kompong Thorn and Kompong Cham provinces was intercepted
on 17 January. Subsequently all persons in leadership
positions in the northern provinces of Cambodia were removed
from their positions. Hu Nim, the Khmer Rouge Information
Minister named by some refugees as the leader of the insur-
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gency, disappeared from public view in January 1977.
The Khmer Rouge, thinking the Thais were at least
partially behind the plots, launched a punitive incursion
into Thai territory. Three Thai villages were attacked
and 30 villagers were killed in a battle which began on
January 28. The food motive was disregarded as the
Cambodians did not take any foodstocks and were apparently
just out for blood in retaliation for perceived Thai
involvement. Although understandable in the light of
82

events, Cambodia did much to alienate world public opinion
which was unaware of the extent of Cambodia's internal
turmoil aggravated as it was because of Hanoi's involvement
Vietnam obviously wanted to regin supreme in Indo-China
and did not want to align itself with China as this would
jeopardize its preeminent status. Cambodia's resistance
towards becoming a junior sibling in Vietnam's family may
have had much to do with succeeding events
.
Cambodia was beginning to show concern about its isola-
tion as seen by Ieng Sary's late March statement that "we
have been attacked from all sides." Vietnam, Laos, and
Chailand were all placing increasing pressure on the
beleagured regime. Ieng Sary, possibly hoping Malaysia
and Singapore would intercede in Cambodia's behalf with
Thailand, asserted that "we are not communists .. .we are
revolutionaries." He further assured them that Cambodia
9 5had not intention to export its revolution.
During April 11-17, 1977, riots were reported in Siem
Reap province in another phase of anti-regime activity.
The incidents were almost totally limited to Khmer Rouge
soldiers although there was some civilian participation.
These incidents were suppressed and followed by widescale
94
purges of civilians and communists.
It is important to note that neither the anti-regime
attempts in January nor the subsequent turmoil in April
was widely known outside of Cambodia. It was months before
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the news was revealed to the outside world and it was not
Cambodia but Thailand who broke the news. Cambodia's
reticence in openly accusing Vietnam indicated that Cambodians
thought that the situation had gone beyond hope of peaceful
reconciliation and justified retaliatory raids.
On April 17- -the second anniversary of the Khmer Rouge
ascendance to power- -the Khmer Rouge unleashed a retaliatory
attack on border villages in Vietnam. Subsequently, on
April 30--the anniversary of Hanoi's victory in South
Vietnam- -the Cambodians launched a second major attack on
95Vietnam. The first attack was to preserve Cambodia's
independence against outside pressures aimed at eroding that
independence. The second attack may have been to remind
Vietnam that the Khmer Rouge had played a part in the
victory over the "American imperialists" and therefore
deserved to be treated as an equal. As will be seen,
Vietnam used these Cambodian attacks to explain its retalia-
tion against the regime which so strenuously opposed joining
with Vietnam in a "special relationship."
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V. THE WAR YEARS: 19 77 AND 19 78
A. INTRODUCTION
The momentous events in Cambodia during the early-
months of 1977 marked the beginning of the end for not
only the Pol Pot regime but for an independent Cambodia
as well. Vietnam could no longer rely on indigenous
elements within Cambodia to overthrow the Phnom Penh
regime as those forces were decimated in purges following
the turmoil in April 1977. Vietnam, therefore, had to
either commit its military to action or abandon its goal
of an Indo-Chinese Federation led by Hanoi. As history
shows, Vietnam chose the former option rather than the
latter and hastened preparations for an invasion of
Cambodia.
The first Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia conducted
in the latter half of 1977 was executed in relative secre-
cy. Cambodia's reticence in publicizing its problems with
Vietnam has already been alluded to. Vietnam, too, had
no desire to have its aggressive behavior publicized
especially after its partner, the Soviet Union, to garner
support for a Soviet sponsored Collective Security Pact
declared so piously in May 1977 that "annexation of terri-
tory through aggression" was impermissable . Cambodia
was eventually forced to abandon its silence in September
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when the border war began to jeopardize its fate. But it
was not until December 31, 1977, when Cambodia severed
relations with Vietnam that the severity of the border war
was recognized by the rest of the world. After that time,
Vietnam could not avert the world's gaze and had to place
added emphasis on diplomacy to achieve its aims. Vietnam's
first invasion of Cambodia in 1977 ended in failure because
of the unexpected tenacity exhibited by the outnumbered
Khmer Rouge.
One result of Vietnam's 1977 invasion of Cambodia was
China's abandonment of official neutrality between the
Indo-Chinese states and assumption of support for Cambodia.
This meant that Vietnam's next venture against Cambodia
would necessarily have to take into account the possibility
of China's active involvement.
With Soviet help in the planning process, Vietnam
readied a military and diplomatic offensive aimed at
preventing China's use of force to sway events. Vietnam
rapidly improved relations with ASEAN and the U.S. to
obtain their neutrality in events to follow while the
Soviet Union moved to neutralize Japan.
The establishment of diplomatic relations between the
U.S. and China and not between the U.S. and Vietnam set
the stage for a Chinese invasion of Vietnam following
Vietnam's victory over Cambodia. The intricate web of
diplomacy worked in China's favor when, to Vietnam's
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dismay, it was the Soviet Union and not China which was
deterred from action. This chapter begins with the
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in April 1977 and ends
with the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in February 1979.
B. BEGINNING OF A NEW CHAPTER, APRIL 1977
Without knowledge of the April incidents, the world
press tended to interpret Cambodia's actions against
Vietnam in May as blatant aggression against Vietnam by
a paranoic Cambodian communist regime. The press was
more disposed to blaming the diplomatically inept Khmer
Rouge for the incidents rather than the urbane Vietnamese
who had more experience dealing with world opinion. To
Cambodia's detriment, widely publicized tales of genocide
in Cambodia while omitting mention of a probable cause for
the killings compounded Cambodia's apparent guilt. It it
were not for Vietnam's instigation of anti-regime turmoil
there would not have been the need for numerous purges
that decimated great numbers of the Cambodian population.
Because of the erroneous interpretation of Cambodia's
actions, Vietnam was able to project the image of an
innocent victim being attacked by an irrational Cambodia.
Due to the adverse publicity given the Cambodians, it was
not always apparent that its border actions against Vietnam




In May 1977 both Cambodia and Vietnam made regular
forays into the other's territory resulting in high
casualties on both sides. A May 8 Vietnamese attack in
Cambodia which resulted in 80 Vietnamese casualties
illustrates the intensity of the conflict. 2 Frequent
Cambodian battle zones in Vietnam included Chau Doc, a
border crossing point, and Ha Tien, located at the extreme
portion of mainland Vitnam across from Cambodia. Cambodia's
strategy was apparently to seal the border as these sites
and future battle areas such as Tay Ninh were on major
routes leading into Cambodia.
The task of sealing the borders was too formidable a
task for the limited number of Khmer Rouge, many of which
were required for internal security in the wake of revolts
in Cambodia. Therefore, to more efficiently utilize its
forces in preventing enemy infiltration into Cambodia,
the Khmer Rouge attempted to move its borders to more
defensible frontiers. For example, Cambodia's attacks on
Ha Tien were probably designed to move the Cambodian-
Vietnamese border to a river to enhance Cambodia's defen-
sive posture.
Cambodia apparently used a similar strategy in Thailand
beginning that summer. According to Richard Nations, "the
pattern of incidents along the 500-mile Thai-Cambodian
frontier ... indicates Phnom Penh's desire to seal the border
where it is most open--the 50-mile stretch of open forest
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and farmland between the Thai border town of Aranyaprathet
to the South and Sangae village in Ta Phraya district to
the North." This historical invasion route into Cambodia--
the Watthana Pass--is the only area in eastern Thailand
offering relatively unimpeded access into Cambodia; else-
where the territory is mountainous and crisscrossed by
rivers. Denigrating exaggerated reports of the Khmer Rouge's
blood thirstiness, Cambodia in August distributed leaflets
to the Thai population in the region warning them to vacate
the area.
Cambodia's attempts to strengthen its defenses along
the poorly demarcated Thai and Vietnamese borders jeopar-
dized rather than insured Phnom Penh's future. Despite
the fact that Cambodia's moves were mainly defensive, they
were perceived by the outside world as primarily offensive
in nature. In the meantime, through the Spring and Summer
of 1977 Vietnam made diplomatic and mi'litary preparations
for the inevitable war with Cambodia. In May, besides the
border war between Cambodia and Vietnam, several events
took place which would have an impact on the future of
Cambodia. The first event was Vietnam's Vice Minister
Hoang Van Loi's secret visit to Phnom Penh reportedly to
discuss Cambodia's attendance at a conference of Indo-
4
Chineses states planned to convene later in 1977. The
secrecy surrounding the trip, however, casts doubt on the
assumption that Cambodia's attendance at an Indo-Chinese
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summit was the main purpose of the visit. Hanoi's subsequent
actions cause one to suspect that an ultimatum of some sort
was presented to the Cambodians. Vietnam may have attempted
to coerce Cambodia into an Indo-Chinese federation and/or
demanded Cambodia's acquiescence to Vietnam's territorial
demands
.
On May 20 Vietnam unilaterally preclaimed sovereignty
over 12-mile territorial waters with a 200-mile economic
zone, and also declared a 12-mile contiguous zone for
security purposes. Cambodia's response was to make a
lengthy radio broadcast listing forty-four islands that
it claimed. Phnom Penh's reaction to what otherwise may
have been viewed as an innocent announcement reflecting a
trend by many countries to expand their sea resources
indicates that Cambodia believed Hanoi was renewing its
claims over territorial seas which Hanoi had formally
agreed to abandon.
Vietnam's expansion of its territorial seas may also
have been aimed against China, Cambodia's protector. On
May 14 Vietnam's ally, the Soviet Union, warned the West
against diverting Chinese expansion towards others,
accused China of attempting to disrupt U.S. -U.S .S.R.
detente and of stirring up territorial disputes. The
statement may be viewed as a deterrent to Chinese reaction
to Vietnam's possible actions against Cambodia. During the
summer China and Vietnam engaged in continual arguments
o
over their relative rights in the Spratly Islands.
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Vietnam's conflicts with China can properly be viewed
in the light of deteriorating Cambodian-Vietnamese relations.
In late May the Khmer Rouge rounded up 500 ethnic Vietnamese
families, executing many of them in eastern Cambodia. This
event signaled that Cambodia would not accede to Vietnam's
demands by anything short of military conquest.
In July according to Vietnamese sources, the Khmer Rouge
decided that they "must not only stop them (the Vietnamese)
and annihilate them on our territory but must cross the
border to stop them and annihilate them right on their own
territory. This is intended to cause more difficulties to
them and increase their fear of us."
At the same time Vietnam made the decision to crack down
on the South to accelerate collectivization and start the
movement of people to the New Economic Zones, and to
neutralize the Overseas Chinese in Vietnam. From that time
on the Overseas Chinese were exposed to discriminatory
policies and ration cuts, especially if they refused to
accept Vietnamese citizenship.
From July onward, Vietnam moved rapidly in its military
preparations. On July 8 Thailand reported that Vietnam
1
2
was building up its forces in Laos. News of this develop-
ment was followed closely by the arrival in Vientiane on
July 15 of the highest-level Vietnamese delegation sent
abroad to that date. Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, Vice Premier
Pham Hung and the political commissar of the army, General
Chu Huy Man, were among the luminaries representing Vietnam
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in discussions which would lead to legitimizing Vietnamese
military presence in Laos. On July 17 Laos and Vietnam
signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation instituting
a "special relationship" between the two countries in which
Laos would follow the Vietnamese political line. Kaysone
Phomvihane of Laos claimed that the pact arose from an
"urgent objective" to defeat the common energy which is
"trying to carry out many subtle and perfidious tricks
and divisive schemes in order to weaken revolution in
each country." In addition to formalizing a relationship
that already existed, the pact provided for Vietnamese
economic and military support over a 25-year period.
Article 7 of the pact provided the first legal basis for
a Vietnamese military penetration into Cambodia. Vietnam
did not waste any time taking advantage of that provision.
On August 1 a Bangkok newspaper reported that large
numbers of Vietnamese troops were moving towards Cambodia
14through southern Laos. Prime Minister Thanin on August 6
revealed that conflicts had occurred between Cambodia and
Laos in addition to the regular skirmishes between Vietnam
and Cambodia. Indicating that. a Vietnamese invasion was
impending, General Giap visited army units in the Mekong
Delta near Kampot on August 8 calling for combat readiness.
On August 14 Cambodia mobilized troops in four areas "to
17
stop enemies from encroaching on -Cambodian territory."
Thailand on August 23 went on full alert thinking that the
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increasing number of Vietnamese troops along its border in
Laos were meant to attack Thailand. 18
C. THE SEPTEMBER CLIMAX, 19 77
In September clashes between Cambodia and Vietnam turned
into full-scale battles reflecting the completion of Vietnam's
military preparations. According to a Vietnamese official the
Party released the army at this time to actively counterattack
Cambodia. Major battles erupted between Cambodia dn Vietnam
on September 1 when Vietnam conducted deep raids into
19Cambodia. Phnom Penh later claimed that Vietnamese troops
in September encroached as far as Stoeng which is 20 km
20
within Cambodia. By September 18 the attacks were severe
enough to force Cambodia into announcing that its troops
were engaged in battle with the Vietnamese for defense of
21Prey Veng province.
To compound Phnom Penh's problems, Cambodia was also
experiencing. internal turmoil during the month of September.
According to Thailand, Cambodia successfully quashed an
attempted coup sometime prior to Pol Pot's September 28
visit to China. Congratulatory messages from both China
and North Korea to the Phnom Penh regime confirm the fact
that an inner party struggle was taking place in Cambodia.
According to the North Korean message from Kim II Sung to
Pol Pot, the Cambodian people had smashed "the counter-
revolutionary group of spies who had committed subversive
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activities and sabotage, working themselves into the
revolutionary ranks for a long time at the instigation
of foreign imperialists." The message further noted that
2 2the persons involved were "unmasked and liquidated."
As a result of the coup attempt, another massive purge
wracked Cambodia. Khmer Rouge army officers up to the rank
of colonel crossed into Thailand because of the ferocity
of the purge aimed at both the remnants of the 6,000 pro-
Vietnamese communists trained in Vietnam in the 1950' s and
the units for which they were responsible. According to
the survivors, 40-50 percent of every village had been
23
wiped out to eliminate the traitors.
In a repetition of history, just as in April 1977
following another coup attempt, Cambodia again lashed out
at the suspected perpetrator of the plot; on September 24,
according to Vietnamese accounts, Cambodia made its
second major attack into Vietnam resulting in 2,000
Vietnamese casualties in Tay Ninh Province and economic
24disruption in the New Economic Zones.
On September 25, the day following Cambodia's incursion
into Vietnam, Pol Pot dropped the pretense that the Khmer
Rouge was not communist and claimed that "foreign friends"
wished it to be known that the communist party was respon-
ds
sible for the victory in 1975. The timing of the announce
ment may not have been coincidental as Pol Pot needed some
pretext to visit China to discuss Cambodia's dire problems
with Vietnam and to gain assurances of Chinese support.
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Celebration of the 17th Anniversary of Cambodia's Communist
Party offered the perfect solution.
China may have insisted upon a cover story for Pol Pot's
visit as it was attempting to maintain an official neutral-
ity between Vietnam and Cambodia. Otherwise, a visit by
Pol Pot without a bonafide explanation would have drawn
much suspicion since that leader had not made a public
excursion from Cambodia since 1975 (though he did make
secret trips to Hanoi and Peking in 1975 to smoothe the
7 ft
border crisis with Vietnam that year). China, of course,
was not neutral and favored Cambodia's position as illus-
trated by a smuggled document obtained by Taiwan sources.
According to the document, Foreign Minister Huang Hua in
a speech to party cadres blamed Vietnam for the border
problems and declared China's willingness to support
Cambodia. Huang was quoted as saying, "Self -conceited
Vietnam deemed that without its help Cambodia could not
have been liberated. Consequently, it assumed the airs of
a Big Brother demanding obeisance from Cambodia in every-
thing. After the liberation, Cambodia had to ask repeatedly
for Vietnam to withdraw its troops. Although Vietnam
eventually acceded to the request, its troops remained
deployed along the border ... .Naturally , it is difficult
for Cambodia to swallow the situation." Concerning China's
support, Huang further averred, "We support the stand of
Cambodia and her people against Soviet revisionist social
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imperialism, and will not watch indifferently any inter-
vention on Cambodian sovereignty or coveting of Cambodian
territory by social imperialism. We will support her people
in their struggle." The document also indicates that China
offered to act as a mediator in the conflict between the
27
two parties.
Pol Pot and his entourage arrived in Peking on September
28 to a tumultuous welcome by 100,000 persons and was met
at the airport by Hua and Teng. Pol Pot could not resist
revealing one purpose behind the visit as he denounced
Thai and Vietnamese territorial incursions against Cambodia
2 8in a speech presented that day. However, the fiction
that the celebration was the main purpose of the visit was
maintained and even extended to Vietnam where the Cambodian
ambassador to Vietnam held a party in Hanoi in honor of
the occasion. Pham Van Dong was in attendance attempting
to maintain the illusion of friendship between the two
* • 29countries
.
The solidarity between Cambodia and Vietnam exhibited
in celebrations in Hanoi was illusory. About that same
time the Cambodian delegation in Moscow was packing up its
possessions to return to Cambodia. A perfunctory congratu-
latory message from the U.S.S.R. to Cambodia never reached
the Cambodian officials who had already vacated their
30
embassy without informing their host. The point of no
return between Cambodia and the U.S.S.R. had been reached;
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Cambodia was now waging its war of survival, not only against
Vietnam, but also against its sponsor, the U.S.S.R.
Vietnam was not unaware of the real purpose behind Pol
Pot's visit to China. According to a Vietnamese source,
Vietnam decided against mounting an immediate counter-
offensive following Cambodia's September 24 attack because
31it did not want to provoke Pol Pot who was visiting China.
More likely, Vietnam did not want to improve Cambodia's
argument against Vietnman by engaging at that moment in an
aggressive act.
Though Hanoi was forced to postpone its counterattack,
there were several indications that an offensive was being
planned. In late September there was speculation that
General Giap made another trip to South Vietnam to make
32preparations for the next military campaign. A military
delegation from Laos visited Hanoi late September possibly
33
to offer its suport to their benefactor. Of possible
military signficance, Vietnam made several attempts to
acquire increased food supplies from Western countries to
ease a shortfall of 1-2 million tons of rice.
Vietnam requested emergency food aid from Denmark
during the last week of September and in October tried to
34
obtain wheat from Australia. In Vietnam the military
provides a significant portion of the agricultural labor;
therefore, a military campaign would require vast inputs of
food to replace that lost when the military abandoned its
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agricultural tasks. The food problem is compounded by the
fact that the military would still consume its share of the
food although it no longer had a hand in the production.
Another sign of an impending war was Hanoi's attacks
against ethnic minorities which, it claimed, continued to
resist the regime. Vu Lap, the chairman of Vietnam's Central
Nationalities Commission, complained in a late September
issue of Tap Chi Cong San that "since liberation day the
reactionaries have secretly incited disturbances in a number
of ethnic minority regions and have taken advantage of our
temporary difficulties and our cadres' weaknesses and short-
comings in implementing some policies to sow division among
ethnic minorities." The article may have been a response
to a Vietnamese decision during the summer to clamp down on
the ethnic Chinese and others who were politically unrelia-
ble.
Vietnam made several open attempts to negotiate with
Cambodia throughout October prior to Vietnamese offensives.
In addition, Pham Hung made a secret visit to China early
in October, probably to confer with Pol Pot. Pham Hung's
visit was more likely an attempt to convince China of
Vietnam's peaceful intentions rather than to negotiate a
settlement with Cambodia.
Upon Pol Pot's return to Cambodia, Vietnam launched its
long awaited counteroffensive against Cambodia. The attack
was severe enough to require Pol Pot's return to China on
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October 13 where he may have conferred with Phan Hien
who was reportedly in China for that purpose. But dis-
cussions that month again failed, and Vietnam conducted
another offensive into Cambodia in late October. 37
Indicating that Vietnam had discarded negotiation as a
viable means to coerce Cambodia from its independent
course, Vietnam began broadcasting on October 31 the theme
TO
of Cambodian brutality.
D. AFTERMATH OF THE VIETNAMESE ATTACK
The state of unofficial war between Cambodia and Vietnam
required both Vietnam and Cambodia to improve relations with
Thailand. This task was significantly facilitated by
Kriangsak's succession to Thanin in power in Bangkok. On
November 11 Cambodia proposed talks to settle their
39disputes, and Kriangsak quickly accepted the offer.
Cambodia, of course, needed every asset it had to wage its
war of survival against Vietnam and could not afford to
have a two-front war against both Vietnam and Thailand.
Border incidents were officially blamed on anti-Pol Pot
elements who wished to sabotage good relations between
Thailand and Cambodia.
Vietnam, too, sought to improve relations with Thailand
to avert a major confrontation along the Thai-Laotian border
41
and to prevent a Thai alliance with Cambodia. Improved
Thai-Laotian relations in October and November reflected the
general uptrend experienced in Thai-Vietnamese relations.
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On October 18 Thailand lifted a three-week ban on oil
shipments across the Mekong to Laos while in mid-November
Thailand resumed shipping of jet fuel to Vientiane. Also
in mid-November, Thailand for the first time began repatriat-
ing refugees to their country of origin. This removed a
major point of aggravation between Thailand and both
Cambodia and Laos. On December 2 both Laos and Vietnam
issued statements calling for improved relations with
Thailand. The Vietnamese statement was part of a joint
communique with Thailand calling for the establishment of
44full diplomatic relations as soon as possible.
As the battles between Cambodia and Vietnam intensified,
Sino-Vietnamese relations took a concomitant downturn.
Vietnam claimed to have captured Chinese nationals fighting
for Cambodia during battles in October, but China denied
that allegation. In late November, during another
Le Duan visit to Peking, China warned Vietnam of Soviet
intentions towards developing countries. A Jenmin Jih Pao
editorial hinted that Vietnam should safeguard that which
it won with the end of war in 1975. The coolness of Le Duan's
reception and the significant rise in the number of ethnic
Chinese leaving Vietnam reflected the worsening relations
between China and Vietnam. On December 3, indicating
open Chinese preference to Cambodia, a high-level Chinese
delegation visited Cambodia in the period of tension prior
48
to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.
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China's diplomatic efforts on Cambodia's behalf were
anathema to the Vietnamese. In addition to its attempts
to improve relations with Thailand, Cambodia, with China's
encouragement, began to improve relations with Burma and
ASEAN. On November 26 Cambodia hosted a visit by Ne Win
of Burma, thereby ending a lapse of relations of two and
49
one-half years. Cambodia also indicated for the first
time in early December that it was willing to engage in
bilateral trade with ASEAN. 50
E. THE DECEMBER OFFENSIVE, 19 77
In the first week of December Vietnam launched a major
offensive into Cambodia. Vietnam's combined arms force of
infantry, armor, artillery and air power immediately pushed
the Cambodians back 10-15 miles from their border in the
51Parrot's Beak area. Cambodia claimed that Vietnam
eventually intrudded into its territory to a distance only
5250 miles from Phnom Penh. Approximately 60,000 Vietnamese
and 20,000 Cambodians were engaged in the battle which
resulted in high casualties for both sides. The Cambodians,
claiming that they were caught off-guard without adequate
forces in the area to stave off the Vietnamese attack
,
reported that there were greater than 2,500 casualties
54
on the Cambodia side alone.
Despite the surprise invasion, Vietnam could not achieve
victory due to the unexpected resistance from the Khmer Rouge.
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Additional problems organizationally precluded complete
Vietnamese success: "On several occasions an army unit
missed the opportunity of annihilating the enemy, or
suffered losses because of laxity in making preparations
and implementing regulations." Sloppy maintenance forced
a large number of mechanized vehicles out of service. 55
On December 31 Khieu Samphan in the 45-minute announcement
severing relations, accused Vietnam of waging "an undeclared
and premeditated war in the same or even worse manner than
the Thieu-Ky and South Korean mercenary troops of the past."
Cambodia demanded that all Vietnamese diplomats leave
Cambodia by January 7, 1978.
F. PREPARING FOR THE CHRISTMAS INVASION, 1978
The most important factor enabling the successful
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 was the Soviet-
Vietnamese tie. For Vietnam, the importance of that
association cannot be overstated; without the Soviet Union's
encouragement and alliance with Hanoi, Vietnam would never
have openly ventured against an ally of China. Without
the Soviet Union's assistance in planning and equipping the
Vietnamese army for the Christmas invasion of Cambodia,
Vietnma would have had to face an interminable war against
an army well-suited for guerrilla operations. The crucial
value of Soviet support was apparent immediately after




At that time the Soviet Union reportedly urged the
Vietnamese to engage in a blitzkreig operation to overthrow
57the Pol Pot regime. Vietnam, however, wished to avoid
appearing the aggressor and continued its strategy of sub-
version backed by military muscle. Hanoi's real motives,
though, were neatly masked by frequent calls for negotia-
tion by both the Soviet Union and Vietnam who blamed
Cambodian intransigence for continued conflict.
Vietnam's retention of Cambodian territory was the main
barrier to Cambodia's acquiscence to discussions. Though
Vietnam agreed to a partial withdrawal of its forces in
January, 1978 it showed every intention of retaining the
territory it still possessed. Indicating that its stay was
not of a temporary nature, Vietnam immediately began forming
administrative districts in occupied areas. Negotiation
with Vietnam while Hanoi's forces remained in Cambodia was,
therefore, impossible. Although Hanoi would achieve some
propaganda value by Cambodia's refusal to negotiate, Phnom
Penh could ill-afford to risk its survival by compromising
with Vietnam.
In conjunction with its calls for negotiation, Vietnamese
diplomats made several trips to offer assurances of its non-
aggression intentions. Nguyen Van Trinh in early January
toured Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines,
indicating to each that Vietnam had no desire to spread
socialism. Phan Hien, meanwhile, ventured to Peking where
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he reportedly tried for a week to contact Cambodian
diplomats. Vietnam did not want to be accused of not
making every effort to improve relations with Cambodia.
Peking, however, was not responsive to Vietnam's initiatives.
In early 1978 China abandoned its over position of
neutrality between Cambodia and Vietnam, and learned un-
5 8
equivocally toward Cambodia. On January 18 China sent
Teng Ying-chao--the widow of Chou En-lai--on a goodwill
mission to Cambodia. She stressed non-aggression and
respect for territorial integrity in barbs aimed at
Hanoi. Indicating that China wished to end Cambodia's
isolation and improve Phnom Penh's relations with its
neighbors, Teng Ying-chao was accompanied by two specia-
lists on Southeast Asia, namely Deputy Foreign Minister
59Han Nien-lung and Asian Affairs Deputy Shen Ping. On
February 1, illustrating that Cambodia accepted Peking's
advice, Thailand and Cambodia agreed to normalize rela-
tions at the earliest possible moment. Thai Foreign
Minister Upadit commented that it was necessary for
Cambodia to be free of aggression and expansion or the
rest of Southeast Asia would "not enjoy peace and security.
China had succeeded in laying the groundwork for the Thai-
Cambodian alliance which Vietnam greatly feared.
While Vietnam was reassuring its neighbors that its
aims were not aggressive, Hanoi readied its plans for the




January General Giap accompanied by General Tran Van Tra
visited battle areas to assess the tactical situation.
Subsequently in February both made visits to Moscow,
probably to formulate strategies against Cambodia.
General Giap's secret visit was reportedly to gauge the
extent of Soviet support while General Tran Van Tra *
s
official purpose in Moscow was to represent Hanoi during
celebrations for the 60th anniversary of the Soviet army.
The February visits of General Ivan Pavlovsky to Laos and
Central Committee member G. V. Romanov to Vietnam indicate
a high amount of Soviet involvement in planning Vietnam's
actions against Cambodia.
During Pavlovsky's surprise visit to Laos Pavlovsky
reportedly conferred with General Van Tien Dung, the head
of the Vietnamese armed forces. General Dung is remembered
for his leadership in the decisive April 1975 campaign
against Saigon. Likewise, Pavlovsky is a master of the
lightning offensive. In the 1960 ? s he successfully promoted
the Manchurian campaign of 1945 as the model for future
Soviet campaigns. The Manchurian campaign is especially
noted for its cover and deception practices (military and
political) which resulted in the total surprise of the enemy.
Within six days the Japanese Kwantung Army was enveloped,
forcing its surrender. 65 In 1968 Pavlovsky had the oppor-
tunity to test his theories when he was in charge of the
Warsaw Pact forces which invaded Czechoslovakia. The
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similarity in tactics used during Vietnam's 1978 invasion
of Cambodia which required fifteen days for victory points
to Pavlovsky's hand in the planning. Pavlovsky's presence
at this stage and his meeting with General Dung indicates
that some type of Vietnamese military campaign was in the
offing
.
In the same time frame as General Pavlovsky's visit to
Laos, G. V. Romanov, 1st Secretary of the Leningrad Oblast
Party Committee, began his visit to Ho Chi City, the head-
quarters for Vietnam's military activity against Cambodia.
Romanov was officially in Ho Chi Minh City to represent
Leningrad during ceremonies to establish sisterhood between
the two cities. It is possible that Romanov conferred with
Le Due Tho who was dispatched to the South. According to
FEER correspondent Nayan Chanda, "Before each major mili-
tary move in the past--the 1968 Tet offensive, the 1972
spring offensive and especially before the final push for
Saigon in April 1975--Tho was dispatched south to make sure
that generals in the field correctly implemented the party
directive." Perhaps a similar plan was in the wind.
Shortly after the visits by Pavlovsky and Romanov,
Hanoi decided to back an all out anti-Pol Pot rebel movement
in Cambodia and crack down on the Chinese merchants in Cholon,
f\ 7
the Chinese quarter in Ho Chi Minh City. Accordingly,
the previous Vietnamese directive to kill all captured
Cambodians was reversed to provide for the capture of as
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many Cambodians alive as possible for use in insurgency
activities. Reportedly, Vietnam rewarded soldiers with
the equivalent of $25 and five days leave for each
Cambodian captured. An estimated 15,000 Cambodian prison-
ers were being indoctrinated to fight against their former
leaders. It is intriguing that at the same time Vietnam
was paying bounty for the capture of Cambodians , Vietnam
was also preparing to ask the United Nations to provide
aid for refugees making their way into Vietnam from
69Cambodia. Humanitarian aid was, therefore, an indirect
means by which Vietnam intended to enlist more recruits
for its plans against Cambodia.
On March 24 Vietnam began to implement its policies
against the ethnic Chinese. At that time a large military
and police force surrounded Cholon in preparation of en-
forcing a Pham Van Dong directive closing 30,000 private
7 fl
businesses. In early April Ho Chi Minh City was closed
to all foreigners due to the unrest caused by Hanoi's new
dictates
.
Vietnam's action against the ethnic Chinese was an
attempt to neutralize a potentially hostile force within
that country and was similar to Hanoi's policies against
other prospective troublemakers. In February Laos and
Vietnam had undertaken an offensive against the Meo
tribesmen who, Hanoi feared, could be induced to align
with China to advance their goal of autonomy in Laos.
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Hanoi's action against the Meos was harsher than that meted
out to the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam but the principle was
the same.
The Soviet Union's alert status along the Manchurian
border with China was another possible indication that
Vietnam was readying a major attack on Cambodia which could
conceivably provoke both Chinese and Soviet intervention.
In March 1978 Sino-Soviet relations were at a perennial low
point, leading Teng Hsiao-ping to warn the Soviet Union that
72it could never hope to defeat the masses of China. In
late March Secretary Brezhnev accompanied by Defense
Minister Ustinov journeyed to the Soviet Far East to inspect
military installations and observe military maneuvers. For
the ailing Brezhnev to make such a difficult trip illustrated
73
the gravity of the tensions between the U.S.S.R. and China.
Frequent border clashes and black-out drills illustrated the
74degree of China-Russia tension.
In early April a force of 100,000 Vietnamese troops were
75
reportedly massed along the Cambodia border, and launched a
series of attacks on five separate areas along Cambodia's
border. Vietnam in April also began to move warplanes from
the north to the south. The invasion plans Vietnam made
during the Pavlovskyomanov visits in February appeared to
be nearing fruition. China, however, remained the major
hindrance to Vietnamese success.
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On April 19, according to Swedish sources, fighting
between Vietnam and China again broke out along their
border. Reportedly tanks were used indicating it was not
a minor skirmish. Both China and Vietnam setn reinforce-
ments to the battle area and entrenched for future con-
77frontations. Apparently anticipating future conflict
with China, General Van Tien Dung in late April made pub-
licized visits to an anti-aircraft facility in Haiphong
and a missile base at Ha Long, one of several new missile
sites in Vietnam aimed at China. At Ha Long General Dung
told personnel they had "pressing tasks to be carried out
urgently." A Soviet delegation from Bladivostok visited
Haiphong in the same time frame illustrating Soviet support
78
against a possible Chinese attack.
All previous Vietnamese campaigns to overthrow Pol Pot
were conducted in conjunction with forces within Cambodia.
In the developing scenario under analysis, Vietnam was
once again preparing an incursion against Phnom Penh, in
all probability with the assistance of insurgents in
Cambodia. During May there were reports of massive purges
in Cambodia and it was later disclosed that eastern Cambodia
79
was the locus of an insurrection. Vietnam's thrusts
toward Phnom Penh in April were, therefore, possibly
effected to weaken Khmer defenses in order to assist the
insurgents, while the feints at five areas around the
border were possibly made to confuse Combodian defenses
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prior to the main attack and to guarantee the success of
any possible insurrection.
Previous purges decimated the ranks of earlier insurgency
forces and new recruits from within Cambodia would have been
difficult to come by especially if reports of Pol Pot's
thorough purges are accurate.
G. THE DOUBLE CHALLENGE OF THE S.R.V: CAMBODIA AND CHINA
The insurrection in Eastern Cambodia of April, 1978 was
intriguing for two reasons. First of all, according to
Cambodian accounts, the aim was to overthrow the Pol Pot
regime, and if that failed the insurgents were to take over
8
the eastern zone of Cambodia and proclaim a new state.
Vietnam would undoubtedly be the protector for this new
state. If the Cambodian report is true, Vietnam's immediate
aim was to gain the rice bowl of Cambodia which is the area
east of the Mekong River. Secondly, both Heng Samrin and
So Phim were leaders of this insurrection and were forced to
81flee Cambodia when the insurrection faded. So Phim was
later killed while leading pro-Hanoi forces while Heng
Samrin later became the puppet ruler of Cambodia under the
Vietnamese tutelage.
The failure of this insurrection prompted Vietnam to
develop insurgency forces entirely from Khmer s residing
outside of Cambodia, i.e., prisoners and refugees. Radio
broadcasts indicated Vietnam had not abandoned insurgency
forces entirely from Khmers residing outside of Cambodia,
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i.e., prisoners and refugees. Radio broadcasts indicated
Vietnam had not abandoned insurgency as the method to
disguise Vietnamese aggression against Cambodia. According
to reports insurgencies were either about to occur or were
8 2in the process of occurring throughout the summer of 1978.
While Vietnam was attempting to encourage the overthrow
of the Pol Pot regime with as little use of Vietnamese
forces as possible, the Overseas Chinese issue in Vietnam
took on a new significance. Both China and Vitnam saw
advantages in exploiting the issues. China desired to draw
attention to Vietnamese transgressions, to show that Hanoi
was no better than the Phnom Penh regime Hanoi continued to
berate. The ill-treatment of the ethnic Chinese was also
an excuse for China to cease aid to Vietnam. It was no
longer logical for China to grant aid to Vietnam especially
since Hanoi was battering on its ally and was firmly
ensconced in the Soviet camp. The Overseas Chinese issue
allowed China to exit gracefully from its illogical associa-
tion with Vietnam.
Hanoi, on its part, soon saw advantages in magnifying
the ethnic Chinese issue. It provided a cover for Hanoi's
aggressive actions along Vietnam;s border with Cambodia,
and it would have been extremely awkward for China to
engage in warfare with Vietnam while it appeared the Overseas
Chinese was the main precipitating factor. Several countries
in Southeast Asia with large Chinese populations believed
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that Vietnam's sanctions against the ethnic Chinese was
an internal matter, thus Peking's action against Hanoi
because of the ethnic Chinese could mean China would use
a similar pretext for intervention in their countries.
Vietnam was, therefore, able to stall for time while it
made military preparations for an offensive into Cambodia.
China claimed that every time negotiations on the issue
of the ethnic Chinese were opened (discussions were convened
five times in the May to September time frame) , Vietnam
84increased its hostilities against Cambodia and China.
Events appear to substantiate China's claims that Vietnam
used the negotiations to mask its aggression elsewhere.
The Overseas Chinese issue, to Cambodia's detriment,
replaced the Vietnamese-Cambodian confrontation from the
front page in newspapers obscuring Vietnam's escalating
military activity against Cambodia. China's decision to
engage in fruitless discussions throughout the Summer of
1978 probably means China, like Vietnam, was stalling for
time. It, too, had to prepare for military confrontations
against Vietnam and its protector, the Soviet Union.
On June 7 Teng accused Vietnam of taking ten steps
against China and said Hanoi was in the process of "taking
its 11th step." China accordingly decided to take a step
8 5
of its own, to reduce aid to Vietnam.
One step Teng was referring to was Vietnam's actions
against Cambodia. In mid-June, Vietnam's military
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preparations resulted in an offensive which was a signifi-
cant escalation of the war. Some analysts claim that the
purpose of Vietnam's offensive at this time was to
relieve the pressure on resistance forces. 86 Vietnam's
strategy through June was to bleed Cambodia to death by the
continuous application of internal and external pressures.
Time was the only necessary ingredient to accomplish the
task, but time was lacking due to Hanoi's greatly escalating
problems with Peking. Vietnam, therefore, came to accept a
Soviet-style strategy of a lightning offensive though it
would still use token Cambodian forces to mask Vietnam's
aggression; it was in mid-1978 that Vietnam began to stock-
8 7pile for its dry season invasion of Cambodia.
Concomitantly, both Vietnam and China improved their
border defenses. In June Vietnamese military preparations
against China included recruiting of one division of self-
defense militia for each of its districts and digging
o o
tunnels in the northern areas of Vietnam. Indicating that
Hanoi expected action against China, General Giap accompanied
89
by Soviet advisors visited border regions with China.
Soviet support was also readily apparent in other areas.
There were reports that the Soviet Union was building a
base on Cat Ba Island which is located outside Haiphong
harbor. The U.S.S.R. was also responsible for installing
91
three radar stations along China's Yunnan province.
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China, too, was making war preparations as indicated by
travelers reports. That June visitors to Kwangsi Province
in China reported seeing military convoys heading south
towards the Vietnamese border. They saw flashes in the night
and heard booms indicating that China was engaging in night
92
maneuvers. By the end of June it was no longer inconceiva-
ble that the two socialist neighbors would engage in a major
conflict
.
China's irritation with Vietnam was greatly exascerbated
by Vietnam's joining COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance) on June 30. Vietnam's joining COMECON was a
closely guarded secret; other members were not advised in
advance. The U.S.S.R. apparently would not grant any more
aid, without this concession on Vietnam's part to bind it
9 3
securely to the Soviet Union. Vietnam's relations with
China were rapidly souring, and on the same day it joined
COMECON, two of three of Hanoi's consulates in Southern
China (the third to follow shortly) were in the process of
being closed due to Chinese insistence. Tensions with
China were bound to escalate even more rapidly in the
months ahead as Vietnam approached its goals against
Cambodia. A closer Soviet-Vietnamese association would,
therefore, be to Vietnam's benefit to deter possible
Chinese hostibilities against Vietnam. Hanoi also antici-
pated China's announcement on July 3 to discontinue all aid
and remove its advisors, and had found in the U.S.S.R. an
alternative for its previous Chinese source of assistance.
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In late July Cambodia's Minister of Defense Son Sen
visited Peking hoping to gain Chinese assurances of support
against the Vietnamese. China responded by providing
Chinese advisors for artillery, air defense and naval units.
Hua told Sen "Your struggle is a just one and a just struggle
is bound to win. We support your struggle." China's support
included arms, food and communications gear for guerrilla
bases readied for the inevitable Vietnamese invasion.
Indicating the extent of Cambodia's desperation, Ieng Sary
in a Conference of the Non-aligned in Belgrade the last week
of July asserted "there is no problem" in establishing
relations if the U.S. was willing to do so. This marked a
fundamental shift in Cambodia's attitude towards the U.S.
Prior to this time Phnom Penh decried the U.S. for allegedly
attempting to overthrow the Pol Pot regime by use of the CIA
in association with Vietnam. Throughout the summer, Cambodia
had been making similar efforts to improve relations with
ASEAN
.
Cambodia's diplomatic offensive was based on the realiza-
tion that short of military intervention by China and any
allies it could muster, only the weight of world opinion
could possibly deter Vietnam's aggression. Cambodia, however,
had a difficult task for itself a world opinion continued to
perceive Cambodia as the more obnoxious of the two countries.
Senator George McGovern, for example, declared on August 21
that he backed U.S. military action against Cambodia to
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overthrow the Pol Pot regime. Cambodia fared badly in
the news and propaganda media of the world.
In late July Vietnam held a full but unpublicized
session of its Communist Party Central Committee, which
"often had to leave behind and discard weak elements in-
capable of enduring trials or bent upon betraying the cause."
Le Duan had succeeded in neutralizing his opposition permit-
97ting the final steps against Cambodia. In mid-August the
Vietnamese Communist Party appealed to all Vietnamese to
be ready to fight a full-scale war. The Soviet Union in
the same time frame began an airlift of materials to equip
Vietnam for its impending dry season offensive against
98Cambodia and a possible confrontation with China.
Ominously, in late August Cambodian irregular forces trained
in Vietnam made their first appearance in the Cambodian
conflict. The insurgency to overthrow Pol Pot which
Vietnam had been promising all summer was clearly about to
commence
.
Meanwhile Vietnam resumed its talks with China on the
Overseas Chinese issue. Indicating that a critical stage
was being approached, a U.S. Congressional delegation
reported that Vietnam was almost desperate to establish
relations with the U.S. 100 This revelation followed
Vietnamese initiatives in July which dropped the require-
ment for reconstruction aid as the price for normalization.
Laos, too, was showing new flexibility towards the U.S.,
indicating for the first time that it would return remains
r tt c • 101of U.S. servicemen.
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In the last week of August 1978, the Soviet Union com-
pleted its airlift of approximately two dozen flights to
102Vietnam placing Vietnam on a war footing. Only final
military and political preparations needed to be made
prior to a dry season offensive. In mid-September, Laos
reportedly withdrew more than 2,500 civilian and military
technicians from northern Laos contiguous to China and
replaced them by Vietnamese. Concurrently, a new Laotian-
Vietnamese offensive was launched against the Meo tribesmen
to prevent their alliance with China, precipitating a new
10 3
exodus to Thailand. Vietnam also continued the process
begun months earlier of moving artillery and infantry to
the Laotian-Cambodian border. In late Fall, Vietnam's
buildup along the Cambodian border reached a peak.
Vietnamese civilians were called upon to set aside food and
fuel for an impending war while the North-South rail routes
were given to the military for their exclusive use.
By the beginning of September, Vietnam had completed
most of its military preparations for an invasion of Cambodia.
Its attention shifted at this point to the diplomatic
realm to prevent potential rivals from concluding alliances
with either Cambodia or China. The Soviet Union, as expected,
participated actively by helping Vietnam neutralize ASEAN
and by making an effort to influence Japan away from an
alliance with China. In addition, Moscow warned the West
against building up China's military might. In September
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Hanoi decided to make the necessary concessions to improve
relations with ASEAN and the U.S.
In early September Pham Van Dong toured ASEAN states
to insure their neutrality and if possible to sign a treaty
of peace and friendship with each of them. In Thailand, on
September 7, Kriangsak and Dong issued a joint communique
declaring "The two prime ministers expressed their determina-
tion. .. (to refrain) from carrying out subversion, direct or
indirect, against each other and from using force or threat-
ening to use force against each other ." Vietnam had
succeeded in neutralizing the country in Southeast Asia most
likely to come to Cambodia's assistance. Pham Van Dong's
assurances that Vietnam would no longer support insurgencies
in Thailand was a small price to pay in exchange for Thailand's
vow not to engage in the use of force against Vietnam. Though
one may argue that Thailand was not bound by the communique,
Pham Van Dong indicated his view on the matter during his trip
to Malaysia. The final communique between Malaysia and
Vietnam, on October 13, included a statement called for peace
and friendship. Hussein described the statement as a "pledge"
107
but Dong referred to it as a "treaty."
Meanwhile efforts to normalize relations with the U.S.
appeared to be nearing fruition. Throughout the summer
Vietnamese diplomats dropped hints that it no longer required
reparations prior to normalization of relations. Vietnam's
insistence on reparations had been the major barrier to
118

normalization since 1975. The U.S., during President Carter's
first year of office, expressed its willingness to normalize
relations first, then discuss aid; but Hanoi refused.
Vietnamese diplomats officially agreed to drop the demand
for reparations in September when the U.S. and Vietnam held
secret meetings in New York. According to Nguyen Co Thach
on September 28, "everything was agreed upon except for the
writing down."
Meanwhile, China and Cambodia were as active as the S.R.V.
in seeking international friends. On October 23 Teng visited
Japan to exchange the instruments of ratification for the
Sino- Japanese treaty signed August 12, 1978. The treaty,
containing an anti-hegemony clause, was a major diplomatic
defeat for the Soviet Union. An August 14 People's Daily
article, for instance, claimed "only Soviet social imperial-
10 8
ism is unhappy" about the conclusion of the treaty. The
Soviet Union showed its displeasure by recalling its am-
bassador to Japan and by lambasting the treaty as an attempt
109
to encircle the Soviet Union. The Russians interpreted
Hua's trip to Romania, Yugoslovia and Iran, in August, as a
further deliberate anti-Russian provocation.
During his October visit to Japan, Teng asserted that
China did not object to a continuing Japanese military
association with the U.S.
110 He also let it "slip" that





China and the U.S. moved rapidly towards normalization
after Brzezinski's visit to China in late May 1978 when he
declared the U.S. had "made up its mind" to normalize
112
relations with China. By that time, China was experienc-
ing difficulties with both Vietnam and the Soviet Union and
was eager to quicken the pace for normalization. Peking's
selection of Chai Tse-min at that time to fill the long-
vacant position in the Chinese liaison office and its
decision to free 110,000 political prisoners (possibly as an
effort to impress President Carter on the human rights issue),
were immediate signs that China wished to move rapidly towards
113
normalization of relations with the U.S. Evidences of
mutual good will were noticeable both in China and the U.S.
throughout the; summer. In September when Cambodia's survival
became questionable, China quickened the pace for normaliza-
tion and even indicated its willingness to be more flexible
on the Taiwan issue. Encouraged by China's stance, the Carter
administration in early October decided to normalize rela-
114
tions with China on January 1.
Cambodia augmented China's diplomatic efforts with those
of its own in an attempt to stave off a Vietnamese invasion.
In mid-October Ieng Sary visited the United Nations where
he invited Secretary Waldheim to visit Cambodia to see for
himself if human rights were being violated. To symbolize
Cambodia's fight to retain its national identity, Cambodia
opened the ancient city of Angkor for visitation by newsmen
120

and diplomats. In late October Ieng Sary made his own
tour of ASEAN states in an attempt to gain their support
against Hanoi.
After the flurry of diplomatic activity the Russians
and the Vietnamese quickly made their decision to launch
a military drive into Cambodia.
On November 1 a high-level delegation from Hanoi, led by
Le Duan and Pham Van Dong, set out for Moscow, where, two
days later, a treaty of friendship and cooperation was
signed. This, they believed, would be the ultimate deterrent
in preventing China from coming to the aid of Cambodia.
Rather than deter China, the treaty insured Chinese inter-
vention.
Up to the time of the treaty, China encouraged Cambodia
to prepare itself for a prolonged struggle of guerrilla
warfare against Vietnam. China accepted the fact that
Vietnam would eventually gain victory in Cambodia. When
told about the treaty while in Thailand, Teng Hsiao-ping
reacted with rage, decrying Pham Van Dong as a liar.
Shadowed by Firyubin, the deputy Foreign Minister of the
U.S.S.R. who was in Southeast Asia at the same time, Teng
continued his tour of ASEAN but failed to gain ASEAN'
s
support for action against Vietnam. China's refusal to
disclaim support for insurgencies like Vietnam helped
predlude ASEAN' s support for China against Vietnam. Teng
also made a surprise visit to Burma, a country which has
acquired new importance to China since Laos and Vietnam
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became securely ensconced in the Soviet camp. Upon return-
ing home on November 14, Teng set about consolidating his
power. It was perhaps Teng's objective at this early date
to assist Cambodia by launching a Chinese attack on Vietnam.
China continued its attempts to normalize relations
with the U.S., although Vietnam at the same time pursued its
117
own campaign for American recognition.
H. THE CHRISTMAS INVASION AND THE CHINESE ATTACK
In November and December a delicate balance existed
between the prospects of war and peace. Vietnam was poised
for a push into Cambodia and China was ready to attack
Vietnam. Both sides sought through diplomatic means to
gain the maximum support or at least tacit acceptance of
their palsn. While Teng feverishly pursued his courtship
of the U.S., the S.R.V. found its solace in stepped-up
activity in Cambodia. On December 3 Vietnam announced the
formation of a Kampuchean United Front in Cambodia to fight
against Pol Pot, thus giving a clear indication of some
impending future action. Two days later the U.S. issued
a warning to Vietnam that Hanoi's links with the Soviet
118
Union imperiled future ties with the U.S. New lines
for an international balance of power in East Asia began
to appear.
Vietnam, meanwhile, launched skirmishes into Cambodia
securing key points for a massive offensive to be conducted
later in the month. On December 13 China delivered a strong
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protest to Hanoi complaining of new clashes along the Sino-
Vietnamese border and in the Gulf of Tonkin. China threatened
that there was "a limit to China's forebearance and restraint
towards the armed provocations against China." Peking warned
that Vietnam should not "complain later than we have not
119given you a clear warning in advance." The propaganda
buildup for the Chinese invasion was well under way.
On December 15 the U.S. and China normalized relations,
the final peacetime accomplishment permitting military action
against Vietnam. Immediately following normalization, China
deployed its forces from across the Taiwan Strait north to
the Soviet borders and south to the Vietnam border, and
120placed its forces in Kwangsi and Yunnan provinces on alert.
Statements made by Hua during an unprecedented news conference
in China exposed the close relationship between normalization
of U.S. relations and the attack on Vietnam. Hua said U.S.-
China relations would "contribute to the anti-hegemony
struggle" and, China "would continue to struggle against
121
big and small hegemonists, both global and regional hegemony."
Although Vietnamese troops remained virtually motionless
in Cambodia, as long as Vietnam continued to hope the U.S.
would normalize relations with Vietnam rather than China.
Vietnam grew more restless as the border situation with China
worsened. In December China claimed it was invaded by "dozens
of Vietnamese armed personnel" and the next day China warned





On Christmas Day, 1978, Vietnam launched its invasion
in force against Cambodia. Vietnam needed only fifteen days
to attain its main military objectives. Phnom Penh fell on
January 7, 19 79, and two days later the Vietnamese and anti-
Pol Pot Cambodian rebels were seen advancing unopposed
toward the Thai border. On January 11 the new forces in
Phnom Penh announced the formation of the Peoples Republic
of Cambodia under Heng Sam rin.
Cambodia's desperate situation left the Pol Pot regime
with little initiative. In the United Nations Ieng Sary
and then the rehabilitated Prince Sihanouk presented the
case for condemning Vietnamese aggression. On January 15,
1979 the U.S.S.R. vetoed the resolution of the United
Nations Security Council calling for Vietnam's removal of
its forces from Cambodia.
China remained as Cambodia's only hope for outside
assistance. On January 11, Ieng Sary undertook a very
12 3delicate mission to China, to confer on possible Chinese
invasion of Vietnam, in order to relieve Vietnamese pressure
on Cambodia. But China needed time to get its own case in
order. During Teng's visit to the U.S., China persented
its rationale for an attack on Vietnam. On January 30
Teng averred, "In the interests of world peace and stabil-
ity and in the interest of our country, we may be forced
to do what we do not like to do." Teng denounced Vietnam's
"massive armed aggression" adding that China would
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"not hesitate even to shoulder the necessary sacrifices to
uphold international justice and the long-term interests of
world peace and stability." China had no intentions of
appearing as an aggressor. Teng took every opportunity
to denounce the Soviet world hegemonist who was behind
Vietnam's actions by decrying the Soviet Union's attempts
to subjugate Southeast Asia and the world.
China's aims were to stem the tide of Soviet expansionism
but that was not the immediate reason for China's attack on
the Vietnamese. The November 3 treaty between the U.S.S.R.
and Vietnam transformed Hanoi from a political ally of the
U.S.S.R. to a military ally. It was probably the last straw
in convincing China that it would undertake military action
if necessary against Vietnam, not only to support China's own
ally, Cambodia, but also to thwart the expansionism of Vietnam
and the hegemonism of the U.S.S.R. using Vietnam as its
surrogate, its Cuba in Asia. Teng returned to China on
February 8 after a stopover in Japan where he publicly
hinted at the possibility of an attack on Vietnam. His plans
must have been definite in his own mind because within a week
after his return to Peking on February 17, he gave the orders
for the invasion of Vietnam.
The fate of Cambodia hung in the balance and no one was
certain how far the Chinese would go in their pedagogical war
to teach the Vietnamese a lesson. And no one could be sure
if the Russians would undertake to teach the Chinese a lesson




Under the control of Le Duan and company,
Vietnam today is no longer an independent
and sovereign country but one subservient
to a foreign power economically, politically,
militarily and diplomatically .
1
This statement was made by Hoang Van Hoan, Vice Chairman of
the Vietnamese National Assembly and one of the founders of
the Vietnamese Communist Party, speaking from Peking after
his defection from Hanoi on July 3, 1979.
In his August 9 declaration, Hoan spoke of serious di-
visions and opposition to the oppressive Le Duan regime; he
equated the policies of Vietnam to towards the ethnic Chinese
as "even worse than Hitler's treatment of the Jews." But
prevalent in his thinking was that the erroneous policies of
Le Duan sacrificed and threatened to turn that country "into
a source of raw materials, a processing plant and a military
base serving the interests of a foreign power." Significantly,
Hoan points to the year 1969 following Ho Chi Minn's death
as the beginning of the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese
relations
.
Le Duan's effusive admiration for all things Soviet in-
cluding the U.S.S.R.'s brand of international communism was
one reason for the tilt to the Soviet Union. However, there
was a more concrete benefit to be gained by association with
the U.S.S.R. Vietnam had long aspired for leadership of an
Indochinese Federation as the first step for its expanding
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into a regional power. China, however, preferred to be
surrounded by friendly but weak neighbors and would not
support Vietnam's hegemonistic goals. If Vietnam wished
to one day fulfill its dreams, it had no choice but to join
in a closer association with the U.S.S.R. who in turn
benefited by advancing its strategy of encircling China.
Through the war years against the United States, North
Vietnam, by necessity, retained the Chinese association,
but after the war it more openly aligned itself with the
Soviet camp. Even prior to April 1975 the Soviet-Vietnamese
partnership was noticeable. It was the U.S.S.R. which
provided the military muscle for North Vietnam to prevail
ultimately over the might of the United States. In 1974
the Soviet Union sided with North Vietnam against China
over the Paracel Islands. Finally, the April 1975 offensive
into South Vietnam resulting in victory was planned with
Soviet assistance.
Soviet backing was most important for Vietnam to achieve
its aims of hegemon- in Indochina. However, Hanoi did not
wish for a total break with China which continued to furnish
a large portion of Vietnam's economic aid. This contributed
to Vietnam's backing down in a 1975 confrontation with
Cambodia and Hanoi's reliance on subversion to undermine an
independent Khmer Rouge regime. By 1977 Vietnam had ade-
quaterly consolidated North and South Vietnam allowing more
blatant actions against Cambodia to force Phnom Penh's
acquiescence in joining an Indochinese Federation led by
127

Hanoi. Cambodia's jealously guarded independence, however,
meant nothing short of an invasion could fulfill Hanoi's
goals
.
Vietnam's first invasion of Cambodia in 1977 was con-
ducted in relative secrecy, but its failure and Cambodia's
decision to make its problems with Vietnam public knowledge,
necessitated a diplomatic offensive to neutralize potential
opponents. The success of this venture resulted in Vietnam's
Christmas invasion in 1978. China refused to be deterred,
however, and managed to achieve a great power diplomatic
position which contributed to Russia's keeping out of the
Chinese-Vietnamese fighting.
In analyzing the events of April 1975 to February 1979,
this study would offer the following conclusions about the
hypotheses which were stated in the introduction.
It seems to have been amply demonstrated that the S.R.V.
has long entertained a desire for a position of leadership on
the Indochina peninsula. The S.R.V. constantly conducted
its diplomacy with its neighbors with the double purpose
of strengthening its own position and weakening its potential
adversaries. It has displayed masterful skills in playing
both ends against the middle. It has alternated the use of
the carrot and the stick--that is, negotiating and fighting--
in dealing with ASEAN as an organization and with each
member state as an individual sovereign power.
The S.R.V. doggedly linked its efforts to put its own
puppets in charge in Phnom Penh with its various invasion
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initiatives. It was when the deep Cambodian spirit of
nationalism refused to compromise with Vietnamese demands
that the Vietnamese were driven to rely on naked force.
This accounts for the Christmas invasion of 1978.
On the larger diplomatic scene, the S.R.V. tried to
neutralize any possible American opposition to its Cambodian
ambitions by seeking normalization of diplomatic relations.
In this endeavor, the S.R.V. lost out to China. At the
outset, the S.R.V. tried to carry water on two shoulders--
to enjoy the blessing of both its communist allies. Again
it was unsuccessful. China supported Cambodia and the S.R.V
was forced to turn to Russia. It was finally the conclusion
of the formal U. S . S . R. -S . R. V. treaty of alliance which gave
the S.R.V. the courage to go all-out in invading Cambodia.
It was that same alliance which sheds light on much of
China's international diplomatic maneuvering and gave China
the determination to relieve the pressure on Cambodia by
attacking Vietnam. China was determined- -but cautiously
so- -to thwart the schemes of Vietnam for hegemony in Indo-
china and of Russia for tightening the circle around China
by reliance on its Vietnamese surrogate. And it is conclu-
sions such as these that American policymakers will have to
bear in mind as they search for the best American position
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